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SWEEP AROUND YOUR OWN FRONT DOOR: EXAMINING THE
ARGUMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE AFRICAN AMERICAN
REPARATIONS
TUNEEN E. CHISOLMt
As a world leader emphasizing the need for international relations grounded
upon democracy and human rights, the United States has yet to face the di-
lemma of how to deal with its own past and its most egregious historical injus-
tices, an obvious example being the legacy of slavery.
INTRODUCTION
The current state of race relations in America is charged with vigorous
debates over the utility of a formal apology for slavery2 and the appropriate
fate of affirmative action,3 as well as vivid reminders of past civil- and gov-
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I Elazar Barkan, Payback Time: Restitution and the Moral Economy of Nations,
TiKKUN, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 52, 58.
2 See Paul Magnusson, A New Ground Zero in the Race Debate?, Bus. WK., Sept. 22,
1997, at 10, 12 (reviewing STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE (1997)) (questioning whether a formal apol-
ogy for slavery will have a significant impact on race relations); Jonathan Alter, The Long
Shadow of Slavery, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1997, at 58, 62 (discussing the varying postures on a
formal apology for slavery by the U.S. government); Nancy Mathis, Clinton Avoids Slavery
Issue: President Asks Race Panel to Look at Education, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1997, at 4
(reporting President Clinton's refusal to discuss the topic of a formal apology for slavery at
the first meeting of his Advisory Board on Race).
3 "We are witnessing a broad-based assault on affirmative action-in the courts, the leg-
islatures, and the media." Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 953 & nn.1-3 (1996) (footnotes omit-
ted) (citing recent court cases, including Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), state
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ernment-sanctioned transgressions against African Americans.4  The en-
slavement of Africans in America from 1619 to 1865 is one of the most
callous, vexatious, near-genocidal violations of human rights in world his-
tory;5 that history is buried in the conscience of this Nation.6 The legacy of
slavery in America is marked by the continued marginalization of African
Americans within the firmly rooted, self-perpetuating economic caste sys-
tem that is this Nation's foundation.
President Clinton has a vision of America becoming "the world's first
truly multiracial, multiethnic, multireligious democracy," so that we as a
Nation will be "better positioned ... to lead the world toward peace and
and federal legislative efforts to repeal affirmative action, and negative press coverage of af-
firmative action that downplays continuing discrimination).
4 The media has played a key role in calling the Nation's attention to little-known or
largely-forgotten incidents in the history of the African Holocaust through docudramas and
movies. See, e.g., AMISTAD (DreamWorks SKG 1997) (portraying the uprising and subse-
quent trial of kidnapped Africans who revolted during their Middle Passage); GHOSTS OF
MIssIssIPPI (Castle Rock Entertainment 1996) (portraying the delay in bringing the assassin
of civil rights leader, Medgar Evers, to justice); MISS EVERS' BOYS (Home Box Office Films
1996) (portraying the victimization of African American men who were subjected to syphilis
and left untreated as part of what has become known as the Tuskegee experiment);
ROSEWOOD (Peters Entertainment 1997) (portraying the destruction of a prosperous African
American town in Florida and the massacre of its residents by a riotous white mob over the
course of three days, without state action to control it). The Tuskegee experiment was a study
of the effects of syphilis on untreated sufferers, conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service
from 1932 to 1972. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (new & expanded ed. 1993). The subjects were 399 African American men in
Macon, Alabama, who were unknowingly subjected to the debilitating progression of syphilis
into the 1960s, despite the fact that medical treatment was available and a cure had been found
by 1947. See id. (telling the story of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment).
5 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 56-197 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing American slavery from
its inception to its end).
6 As one journalist puts it, "Slavery is such a gash in the national psyche that mainstream
American culture rarely dares to touch it." Alter, supra note 2, at 60; see also supra note 4
(noting recent films dealing with the little-known and often-forgotten plight of African
Americans).
7 See Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African
Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 640 (1993) ("When slavery ended, it was replaced by a
caste system designed to maintain the status quo of... white supremacy. The caste system
was supported by state and local laws, the courts, the Constitution as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, and the American people." (footnotes omitted)). But cf
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("There is no caste here.
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally ERIC FONER,
POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 10-11 (1980) (noting the centrality
of slavery to the American experience, including the American Revolution and industrial ex-
pansion); infra text accompanying notes 147-51 (noting illustrations of the exclusion of Afri-
can Americans).
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freedom and prosperity" in the twenty-first century.3 To that end, the Presi-
dent has commissioned the "President's Advisory Board on Race" to ex-
amine how we can end the racial divide that still pervades the Nation more
than three decades after the end of overt, systemic discrimination and Jim
Crow laws.9 The order provides that the board
shall advise the President on matters involving race and racial reconciliation,
including ways in which the President can: (1) Promote a constructive national
dialogue to confront and work through challenging issues that surround race;
(2) Increase the Nation's understanding of our recent history of race relations
and the course our Nation is charting on issues of race relations and racial di-
versity; (3) Bridge racial divides by encouraging leaders in communities
throughout the Nation to develop and implement innovative approaches to
calming racial tensions; [and] (4) Identify, develop, and implement solutions to
problems in areas in which race has a substantial impact, such as education
economic opportunity, housing, health care, and the administration ofjustice
lu
That agenda echoes the famous I Have A Dream speech in which Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr. painted his vision for a harmonious multiracial, multi-
ethnic, and multireligious American democracy.11 That was three and one-
half decades ago, and still, America is far from reaching a true equal-access
democracy in which every individual enjoys full citizenship 12 and equal op-
portunity. 13 "If we can finally achieve [that] multicultural balance, America
8 President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the New England Presidential Luncheon, in
Boston, Mass. (June 30, 1997), available in 1997 WL 10085085.
9 See Exec. Order No. 13,050, 3 C.F.R 207, 207-08 (1997) (establishing the President's
Advisory Board on Race).
10 Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
II See Martin Luther King Jr., Keynote Address of the March on Washington, D.C. for
Civil Rights (Aug. 28, 1963), in I HAVE A DREAM: WRrriNGS AND SPEECHES THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 101, 105-06 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992) ("[W]e will be
able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brother-
hood.... [A]l1 of God's children-black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Catholics
and Protestants-will be able to join hands ... ."). The march marked the centennial of the
Emancipation Proclamation.
12 The concept of full citizenship may be familiar, and yet unclear. See Talcott Parsons,
Full Citizenship for the Negro American?: A Sociological Problem, 94 DAEDALUIS 1009,
1009 (1965), reprinted in I RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 423, 423 (1992) ("As the British sociologist T.H. Marshall has
shown with particular clarity, citizenship is a complicated matter which is by no means ex-
hausted by the more literal meanings of the term 'civil rights."' (footnote omitted)). For clari-
fication of the term "full citizenship" for purposes of this Comment, see infra Part II.C.
13 See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Namyan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Prefer-
ential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate,
11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 1, 4 (1994) (focusing "on considerations of equality and full citi-
zenship as they relate to the rights of Blacks and other marginalized Americans"). Harris and
Narayan argue that women and people of color "continue to face institutional obstacles to
equal consideration and equal treatment. These obstacles include not only continuing forms
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would unquestionably be perceived as the moral leader of a world charac-
terized by intranational ethnic dissension and oppression.
14
In recent years, however, many have interpreted the very protections
that were enacted to alleviate systemic racial discrimination against disad-
vantaged minority groups' 5-namely, the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII-in a way that threatens to eradicate progress. 16 California's Proposi-
tion 209,17 which succeeded in amending the California Constitution, is
spawning "copycat" legislation that ultimately may result in the demise of
government affirmative action. 1 Some affirmative-action opponents justify
of blatant racism and sexism, but, more importantly, a variety of subtle institutional practices
that impede equal opportunity .... " Id. at 17-18. Studies reflecting the imbalance of the
white and black experience bear this out. See, e.g., infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text
(discussing evidence of racial discrimination in employment, housing, and loans).
14 Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L.
REv. 863, 874 (1993).
15 While the author acknowledges that American racial dynamics are not solely a matter
of "black and white," the focus of this Comment is on African Americans. To that end, this
Comment will discuss race relations in the context of the African American/white American
experience.
16 See, e.g., Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
the school board's affirmative-action plan violated Title VII because the plan, which was
adopted to promote diversity by retaining minority teachers where potential candidates for
layoffs were equally qualified, was not remedial in nature). It seems only logical that the
strides gained through remedial actions-in this case the hiring of more minority teachers-
should be preservable by allowing some consideration of diversity during downsizing, when
all else is equal. Anything less would result in either: (1) pretextual hiring, where employers
hire minorities to remedy past discrimination, but lay-off or fire for what appears to be a non-
discriminatory reason; or (2) cyclical hiring, where employers layoff minority teachers with-
out consideration of their numbers, necessitating later affirmative efforts to "re-remedy" by
hiring more minority teachers.
California's Proposition 209 provides, in part, that:
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any in-
dividual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not necessarily be lim-
ited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county, public university system,
including the University of California, community college district, school district,
special district, or any other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of
or within the state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless
of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise
available for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination law.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31. Ironically titled the 1995 Civil Rights Initiative, this state legisla-
tion effectively eliminates the use of affirtmative-action programs by California state institu-
tions.
18 See Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 2128, 104th Cong. (1995) (prohibiting "dis-
crimination and preferential treatment on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex with
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their position by suggesting that the elimination of all race-preferential poli-
cies in favor of a strict meritocracy reflects King's ideal. 19 Against the
backdrop of race-neutral policy reasoning, President Clinton's vision con-
jures up images of the utopian America that we have not been able to
achieve-images of an America where people are judged by the "content of
their character 20 and where we truly can all just get along.21 A discussion
of whether colorblindness is a necessary step to achieve equality, or whether
respect to Federal employment, contracts and programs, and for other purposes"); Sturm &
Guinier, supra note 3, at 953 n.2 (noting the efforts of the Illinois, Georgia, and Pennsylvania
state legislatures "to end race and gender preferences"). As government affirmative action
declines, so too does private sector affirmative action. A recent disclosure of blatant discrimi-
natory animus within the upper echelons of Texaco is illustrative:
This particular company's management structure has also been impervious to its
previously stated diversity goals. One mid-level manager in Houston, when in-
formed of a Black employee's discrimination complaint, replied, "I'd fire her Black
a[**]." Informed that this was illegal, the manager sniffed, "I guess we treat niggers
differently down here." That exchange was contained in an affidavit filed in federal
court.
John William Templeton, Texaco Settlement Doesn't Settle the Underlying Power of Imbal-
ance, WASH. AFRO-AM., Nov. 30, 1996, at A5.
19 See Equal Opportunity Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2128 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 17 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R 2128] (statement of Rep. Susan Molinari) ("Our country has long believed
that people should be measured on their own merit, not because of their skin color or sex.");
see also CERTAIN TRUMPET PROGRAM, TALKING BACK: FRAMING MEMO: THE
AFFIRMATivE ACTION DEBATE A4 (Sept. 1996) (identifying the I Have A Dream speech as a
metaphor for the anti-affirmative-action position in favor of a color-blind society);
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND
AMERICAN VALUES 84 (1996) ("Critics of race-conscious measures often invoke Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.'s 'content of their character' passage in urging that we hasten the realization of a
color-blind society by insisting on color-blind practices now .... ).
Ironically, or perhaps not, those recalling this speech often overlook King's symbolic ref-
erence to America giving "the Negro people a bad check; a check which has come back
marked 'insufficient funds,"' which followed his likening of the Declaration of Independence
to a promissory note. King, supra note 11, at 102. Although the reference to a payment of
debt may have been symbolic, Verdun argues that "King made the reference to the 'bad
check' in a historical context which carries the clear inference that the check was for historical
wrongs." Verdun, supra note 7, at 604 n.21. King's frequent references to the American
dream in other speeches were "directed mainly to the white public-the federal government,
southern moderates, northern liberals, and religious communities-because he believed they
had the material resources and the moral capacity to create a world based on the principles
that they claimed to live by." JAMEs H. CONE, MARTIN & MALCOLM & AMERICA: A
DREAM OR A NIGHTMARE? 67 (1991). King concluded "that without economic justice, the
right to a job or income, talk about 'life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' was nothing but
a figm ent of one's political imagination." Id. at 223.
20 King, supra note 11, at 104.
21 Following the outbreak of the 1992 race riots in Los Angeles, Rodney King asked in
striking simplicity: "Can't we get along? Can't we all just get along?" Matthew Dallek, Af-
ter L.A., Hope Does Exist, S.F. EXAMINER, June 18, 1992, at A19, available in 1992 WL
7582730.
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colorblindness is even desirable as an end objective, is beyond the scope of
this Comment. However, "assum[ing] that our goal is a color-blind society,
whatever that really means," 22 the question is whether "requiring that people
act in a color-blind manner [will] hasten the day when people actually think
in a color-blind way in their socially and economically significant dealings
with others. ' 23  The evidence suggests not. Despite some progress,
"[e]conomic and social disadvantages remain powerfully linked with color,
and this linkage exacts an enormous toll on the perception and reality of op-
portunity in America. Racial discrimination and race-based exclusion re-
main significant forces."
24
Therefore, I submit that at least one prerequisite to resolving the di-
lemma of race relations in America is reparations for African Americans.
The issue addressed in this Comment is whether legislative reparations are a
justifiable remedy for African Americans, particularly in light of the immi-
nent dismantling of affirmative action with Proposition 209 and the deci-
sions that have followed. 25 Part I gives a brief overview of the quest for Af-
rican American reparations since the end of slavery. Part II focuses on the
continuing effects of slavery and systemic discrimination, and on the argu-
ment that continuing black and white inequities are rooted in such institu-
tions. This Part discusses wealth as a measure of inequity to set the stage
for determining damages and the appropriate compensation. Part III dis-
cusses why reparations are a prerequisite to an equitable society. In addi-
tion, Part III reflects on the "moral economy" incentive for granting repara-
tions to African Americans. Part IV presents the rationale for a legislative
remedy in the context of distributive justice. This section reviews the Civil
Liberties Act as a precedent for race-based reparations, and discusses the
arguments reconciling African American reparations and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Finally, Part V offers suggestions in answer to the who, what,
and how of implementing an African American reparations scheme.
22 EDLEY, supra note 19, at 82.
23 Id. at 81-82.
24 Id. at71.
25 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (challenging,
but failing to stop, the enactment of Article 1, § 31 of the California Constitution (Proposition
209) on the grounds that it denied equal protection and conflicted with federal civil rights
statutes); see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contract-
ing."); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of race as a fac-
tor in law school admissions in favor of increasing minority enrollment violates the 14th
Amendment).
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I. HISTORY OF THE QUEST
Five major waves of political activism have promoted the idea of repa-
rations for African Americans since the emancipation of slaves: (1) the
Civil War Reconstruction Era,26 (2) the turn of the twentieth century,27 (3)
the Garvey movement, (4) the Civil Rights movement,29 and (5) the resur-
gence of efforts following the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,30 which, most re-
26 See infra text accompanying notes 36-53 (discussing the implementation of the Con-
fiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862 during the Civil War, the institution of the Freedmen's Bu-
reau after the Civil War, and the Bureau's efforts to provide transitory assistance and some
restitution to ex-slaves). For a detailed history, see generally GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A
HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN's BUREAU (1955), which discusses the origins of the Freedmen's
Bureau after the Civil War, its impact on the lives of freed slaves, and its eventual demise.
27 "Efforts to get Congress to pass legislation [at the turn of the century] appropriating
economic relief to freedmen were spearheaded by Walter R. Vaughan, a white business-
man ... who also started the first ex-slave pension and bounty organization." Verdun, supra
note 7, at 602. Meanwhile, "Mrs. Callie D. House and Reverend Isaiah H. Dicker-
son... established the National Ex-Slave and Mutual Relief Bountys Pension Association in
1894 and actively promoted reparations to ex-slaves until the movement fizzled, when House
and other members of the Association were indicted for mail fraud in 1916." Id. at 602-03.
28 Marcus Garvey solicited funding to enable Africans to return to Africa for the forma-
tion of an independent nation. See generally THE PHILOSOPHY AND OPINIONS OF MARCUS
GARVEY (Amy Jacques-Garvey ed., 1992) (discussing Garvey's perspective on the African
Americans' problems and relocation to Africa as the solution). Garvey "told blacks that racial
prejudice was so much a part of the civilization of whites that it was futile to appeal to their
sense of justice and their high-sounding democratic principles." FRANKLIN & Moss, supra
note 5, at 357. Garvey reportedly raised $10 million between 1919 and 1921, before he was
imprisoned in 1925 for mail fraud. He was later pardoned by President Coolidge and deported
back to Jamaica. See id. at 358-59 (recounting the rise of Garvey's Universal Negro Im-
provement Association and its eventual collapse because of Garvey's conviction and deporta-
tion).
29 See B. Kwaku Duren & Neelam Sharma, The Case for Reparations, TURNING POINT,
Feb.-Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 36, 37 (writing that in the 1960s, the Black Panthers demanded resti-
tution); see also id. at 37 (noting activist Queen Mother Audley Moore's appeal to the United
Nations for reparations); Verdun, supra note 7, at 605 n.23 (noting the lobbying efforts for
reparations by Queen Mother Audley Moore). Calls for reparations during this time-par-
ticularly the Black Manifesto and the efforts of the Panthers Movement-were perceived as
radical and, unfortunately, led to further marginalization of the idea. See, e.g., Magee, supra
note 14, at 883 (noting the relegation of reparations proposals to "a marginal position as a
'radical' alternative among remedial options" and stating that James Forman's 1969 'Black
Manifesto' demand for reparations from white churches stunned and alienated the white re-
ligious world of the post-Martin Luther King era"); see generally BLACK MANIFESTO:
RELIGION, RACISM, AND REPARATIONS (Robert S. Lecky & H. Elliott Wright eds., 1969)
(collecting articles by authorities on the Black Manifesto and reparations). Affirmative action
was the compromise to the more organized pressures of the Civil Rights Movement. See
Magee, supra note 14, at 884 ("Soon after Forman's historic speech, affirmative action began
its rocky road of partial acceptance and implementation.").
30 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the Civil Liberties Act, which provided for reparations
to Japanese American internment victims and relocated Aleuts from World War II). The pas-
sage of the Civil Liberties Act in 1988 spawned a number of reparations initiatives for African
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cently, has been fueled by the trend toward an official dismantling of af-
firmative-action policies. The redress sought has included claims for back
pay of slave wages; land acquisition and educational benefits; 31 monetary
compensation for abuse, indignities suffered, forced indoctrination into a
foreign culture, and/or destruction of the family unit;32 relocation to Africa
or designated lands;33 relief from income tax obligations;34 and forty acres
and a mule, or the equivalent value.35 For purposes of this Comment, the
focus is narrowed to only that compensation necessary to enable slave de-
scendants to function in an America with race-neutral policies. Conse-
quently, exodus and other separatist options are not considered.
Americans: the formation of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America
("N'COBRA") in 1989 as an umbrella organization for dozens of locally based organizations
across the Nation; an unsuccessful 1993 class action suit against the United States government
for tax immunity; a 1994 petition for reparations filed with the United Nations Subcommis-
sion on Human Rights Violations by the Lost and Found Nation of Islam, on behalf of African
Americans, against the United States; and the birth of the reparations bill which is now known
as H.R. 40. See Duren & Sharma, supra note 29, at 37 (discussing each of these initiatives).
31 See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (detailing the development of the Freedmen's Bureau
from 1861 to 1870); see also infra text accompanying notes 41-53 (discussing the Freedmen's
Bureau Acts).
32 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (seeking "compensation
of $100,000,000 for forced, ancestral indoctrination into a foreign society; kidnapping of an-
cestors from Africa; forced labor; breakup of families; removal of traditional values; depriva-
tions of freedom; and imposition of oppression, intimidation, miseducation and lack of infor-
mation about various aspects of their indigenous character").
33 See supra note 28 (discussing the exodus movement initiated by Marcus Garvey).
34 See Calvin J. Allen, The Continuing Quest of African Americans to Obtain Reparation
for Slavery, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG., June 9, 1995, at 33, 33 (discussing numerous historical
attempts by African Americans to obtain reparations for slavery); Peter M. Berkery, Jr., IRS
Again Denies Reparation Claims, ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8970172 (discussing the receipt and denial of thousands of reparation claims by the IRS); IRS
Receives Thousands of Claims for Slavery Reparation, J. ACT., Oct. 1996, at 34, 34 (report-
ing on the thousands of tax claims for reparations that have been received and rejected by the
IRS); cf I.R.C. § 6702 (1994) (imposing a penalty for "frivolous" claims, which has been in-
terpreted to include claims for reparations).
35 See Allen, supra note 34, at 33 (reporting one estimate that the 40 acres and a mule due
to four million slaves in 1886 was valued at $300-$500 million or $43,209 per African
American household in 1995); IRS Receives Thousands of Claims for Slavery Reparation, su-
pra note 34, at 34 (noting that, as of 1996, economists estimated the value of 40 acres and a
mule at S40,000). Anyone who has seen a Spike Lee production is at least vaguely familiar
with this phrase that has become a shorthand for the African American claim to slave repara-
tions. Spike Lee is a film producer who has incorporated his production company under the
name "Forty Acres and a Mule Filmworks." See Nina Darnton, Film Notes: Film's 300 Ex-
tras Belong to a Tribe, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1986, at 50. The term originates from the vetoed
Freedmen's Bureau bill which initially proposed to distribute land to freed slaves. See infra
text accompanying notes 46-52 (discussing the modification of the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau
bill to exclude the provisional 40 acres to freed slaves so that the bill could override President
Johnson's veto).
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Early reparations measures were legislative remedies which Congress
promoted not only to aid the transition of freed Africans from slavery to
freedom, but also to gain leverage during the Civil War through confiscation
of land from rebels. 36 According to Foner, the "Confiscation Act, of August
1861, was directed only against property used in aid of the rebellion." 37 The
1862 Confiscation Act authorized the taking of all rebel property, amassing
thousands of acres of land; however, "President Lincoln, who strongly op-
posed widespread confiscation, forced Congress to ... limit[] the seizure of
land to the lifetime of the owner." 38 The Lincoln administration did little to
enforce the 1862 Act, which was eventually repealed to make way for a
measure authorizing permanent seizure. 39  Nevertheless, freedmen were
permitted to settle on thousands of acres of abandoned land in South Caro-
lina and Georgia pursuant to General Sherman's field order.
40
The Freedmen's Bureau Act of 186541 created the Bureau of Freed-
men's Affairs to provide special assistance to refugees and persons of Afri-
can descent. The 1865 Act, effective for one year, authorized the lease and
sale of confiscated land to refugees and Africans and was broad enough to
enable the Bureau to supply basic necessities and medical assistance. 4' The
1866 Freedmen's Bureau bill,43 in turn, proposed to extend the 1865 Act in-
definitely, to authorize Congress's appropriation of funds to purchase school
buildings for refugees and freedmen, and to empower the President to "re-
serve up to three million acres of 'good' public land," for lease and sale "to
freedmen and refugees in parcels not exceeding forty acres."'  The 1866
bill passed in both the House and the Senate, but President Johnson unex-
pectedly vetoed the bill, and it failed to garner enough votes to override the
veto. 5 The bill was modified to exclude the land reservation-no forty
36 See ERIC FoNER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 131 (1980)
("[A]s the war progressed, increasing numbers of Republicans were converted to the view that
the confiscation of rebel property would be a legitimate war measure.").
37 Id.
39 Id.
39 See id. at 132 (noting that no measure effecting a permanent seizure was ever enacted).
40 See id. (referring to General Sherman's order settling freedmen on abandoned land in
South Carolina and Georgia then held by the government).
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507.
42 See Schnapper, supra note 31, at 760-61 (recounting the three substantive provisions of
the 1865 Freedmen's Bureau Act which authorized the confiscation and sale of abandoned
land to freedmen and gave the Bureau 'the control of all subjects relating to refugees and
freedmen').
43 S.60, 39th Cong. (1866).
44 Schnapper, supra note 31, at 762.
45 See id. at 769-71 (discussing President Johnson's unexpected veto of the 1866 Freed-
men's Bureau Bill and the unexpected switch by several supporters of the bill after Johnson's
lengthy veto message, such that the veto could not be overridden).
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acres-and to extend the Bureau Act for only two years; however, the new
bill "provided special aid and protection" for African Americans that was
"substantially more explicit than the vetoed bill or the 1865 Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act.
' 6
First, the modified 1866 Act authorized the Bureau to assist freed Afri-
can Americans as necessary to ensure that their freedom was 'available to
them and beneficial to the Republic," '47 but limited the authorized assis-
tance to white refugees to "that assistance necessary to make them self-
supporting." 8 Second, the modified bill limited educational programs to
freed African Americans, whereas the vetoed bill had authorized "construc-
tion of schools 'for refugees and freedmen dependent on the Government
for support."' 9 Third, the modified bill provided protections to free African
Americans who were already occupying certain abandoned land pursuant to
General Sherman's field order.5s Fourth, the modified bill prohibited only
discrimination on the basis of race or color or previous condition of slavery,
instead of also protecting refugees from discriminatory administration of
civil and criminal law.51 Again Johnson vetoed the bill, but Congress voted
to enact the 1866 Act nonetheless. 52 The Act went into effect in 1868, and
for two years, the Freedmen's Bureau enacted legislation for the education
of freed African Americans. 3 In 1870, however, a bill proposing indefinite
continuation of education benefits passed in the House but died in the Sen-
ate, ending the Freedmen's Bureau activity.
54
Since the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, there has been no consistent meas-
ure of reparations for African Americans.55 In 1989 and in every session of
46 Id. at 773 (discussing H.R. 613, 39th Cong. (1866) (later enacted as Act of July 16,
1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173)).
47 Id. at 772 (quoting Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 stat. 173, 174).
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting S. 60, 39th Cong., § 1 (1866)).
50 See id. at 773 n.106 (describing the bill's specific reference to General Sherman's or-
der).l
See id. at 773 (describing the modified bill's lessened protection for white refugees).
52 See id. at 774-75 (stating that President Johnson's opposition was based in a distaste
for "special treatment" for African Americans).
SSee id. at 780-81 ("In most years more than two-thirds of all funds expended by the
Bureau were used for the education of freedmen.").
54 See id. at 783 (discussing the demise of the Freedmen's Bureau).
55 Although some would argue that affirmative action is a form of reparations, affirma-
tive action has not impacted significantly the African American masses, particularly those of
lower socioeconomic status. See CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrERs 63 (1993) ("Like earlier
defacto affirmative action measures in the American past[,] ... recent efforts to broaden ac-
cess to America's prosperity .... always benefit middle-class Americans disproportion-
ately.").
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Congress since 1993, the African American Reparations Commissions Act
("H.R. 40") has been introduced, calling for the establishment of a Commis-
sion to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans.56 To date, the
bill has not gone past the Committee on the Judiciary.
II. THE LEGACY OF SLAVERY: DEFINING THE HARM
Disparities in wealth between blacks and whites are not the product of haphaz-
ard events, inborn traits, isolated incidents or solely contemporary individual
accomplishments. Rather, wealth inequality has been structured over many
generations through the same systemic barriers that have hampered blacks
throughout their history in American society: slavery, Jim Crow, so-called de
jure discrimination, and institutionalized racism.
57
Simply put, reparations for African Americans is a touchy subject.58
The inequalities between blacks and whites in America often manifest
themselves, and are therefore expressed, in terms that do not clearly relate
back to slavery and the ensuing discrimination. For example, African
Americans represent approximately 12% of the population, but account for
45% of prisoners nationwide;5 9 African Americans are 6.8 times more likely
Critics of any type of amends [including reparations] for... African Americans say
blacks have already received retribution through the Freedmen's Bureau and more
recently through affirmative action. Proponents counter that neither adequately ad-
dressed the legacies of slavery, particularly since they were both cut off before their
time.
Duren & Sharma, supra note 29, at 37.
56 See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40,
105th Cong., § 2(b) (1997) (sponsored by Rep. John Conyers) (proposing to establish a com-
mission to examine the institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and eco-
nomic discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants, and the impact of these expe-
riences on living African Americans, and to recommend "appropriate remedies"); H.R. 891,
104th Cong. (1995) (same); H.R. 40, 103rd Cong. (1993) (same); H.R. 3745, 101st Cong.
(1989) (same). For a summary of the proposed legislation, see infra text accompanying note
259, discussing the key provisions of H.R. 40.
57 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 12-13 (1995).
59 See Alter, supra note 2, at 63 ("Americans whose forebears didn't own slaves (even in
the antebellum South, 95 percent did not) or arrived here after slavery ended are understanda-
bly resistant to the idea that they bear direct responsibility for slavery because of their skin
color.").
59 See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 246 (1995) (presenting statistics for African American prisoners versus the national
population and selected state populations); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Blind Justice?: Race,
the Constitution, and the Justice System, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 235, 235-59 (John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995) (discuss-
ing racial disparities in sentencing, prosecutorial discretion, exercise of police discretion, jury
deliberations, and the application of statutes).
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than whites to be homicide victims; African American families are 4.3
times more likely to live below the poverty level than whites;6 African
Americans are only 65% as likely as whites to own their own home; 62 and
the teenage pregnancy ratesof African Americans is twice that for whites.
63
Moreover, the unemployment rate of African Americans is more than twice
than that of whites; 64 whites are at least two times more likely to have com-
pleted four or more years of college than African Americans; 65 and while
the median income for whites increased by 11% from 1970 to 1992, that of
African Americans decreased by 1%.66
The connection between historical race bias and these statistics-par-
ticularly those for teenage pregnancy, imprisonment, and homicide-is not
readily apparent. To assume that the statistics reflecting black and white in-
equities have no relation to past patterns of discrimination is to accept an
argument that these statistics reflect the true inherent abilities or disabilities
of African Americans. As the ensuing discussion will show, however, and
as other studies have shown, this is not the case.6 7 The result of this appar-
60 See HACKER, supra note 59, at 241 (figure rounded). Death rates were higher for Af-
rican Americans as a compared to whites for 21 of the 24 cause-of-death categories presented,
including homicide, various diseases, pregnancy and childbirth, infant death, and drug-
induced causes. See id. The three causes of death that were not higher were motor vehicle
accidents occurring at 98% of the white rate, pulmonary disease at 83%/o, and suicide at 57%.
See id.
61 See id. at 106 (figure rounded).
62 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 109.
63 See HACKER, supra note 59, at 82 (showing an under-18 pregnancy rate of 40.7% for
blacks and 20.5% for whites).
64 See HACKER, supra note 59, at 109 (showing that African American unemployment
was 2.15 times that of whites for 1993 and that the averaged comparative rates for the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s were 2.09, 2.02, and 2.37, respectively); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57,
at 24.
65 See HACKER, supra note 59, at 244 (showing that the number of whites with four or
more years of college was 211% greater than that of African Americans in 1993, 246% greater
in 1960, and 400% greater in 1940).
66 See id. at 104 (showing income in 1992 dollars changing from $36,494 in 1970 to
$40,421 in 1992 for white families, and from $21,330 in 1970 to $21,161 in 1992 for black
families).
67 Cf RONALD J. FIsCus, THE CoNsTrrITmoNAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 19-20
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1992) (arguing that "[i]f there are no race-correlated differences in
intellectual ability at birth, and no differences in character," and no racism to impact opportu-
nity, attitudes and values, then the pool of best qualified applicants for a graduate school
would proportionally reflect the racial makeup of the population). Although Fiscus's argu-
ment is idealistic, it does have evidentiary indications of merit.
The correlation between family income and SAT [scores] is nearly four times larger
than the incremental improvement in prediction offered by the SAT used in con-
junction with high school grades.... Within each racial and ethnic group, SAT
scores increase with income.
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ent disconnection is often a reflexive denial of the relationship between
slavery and the Jim Crow era to any racism that exists today.68 The need for
a more concrete way of assessing the injury to African Americans is an-
swered, in part, by considering wealth.
A. Wealth as the Measure
As Oliver and Shapiro argue in Black Wealth/White Wealth, private
wealth is a more appropriate indicator of inequality than income, education,
or occupation, because "the command over resources that wealth entails
is... closer in meaning and theoretical significance to our traditional no-
tions of economic well-being and access to life chances." 69 According to
Oliver and Shapiro, although "resources theoretically imply both income
and wealth, the reality for most families is that income supplies the necessi-
ties of life, while wealth represents a kind of 'surplus' resource available
for... securing prestige, passing status along to one's family, and influ-
encing the political process." 70 If, for instance, wealth affords an individual
the opportunity to acquire controlling ownership of a production facility,
that individual is freed from authority structures and can enjoy occupational
autonomy. Transfer of that wealth from generation to generation assures
that the position of authority and opportunity remain in the same family;
thus wealth enables one to account for cumulative advantage and disadvan-
Reliance on high school rank alone excludes fewer people from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. When the SAT is used in conjunction with high school rank
to select college applicants, the number of applicants admitted from lower-income
families decreases. This is because the SAT is more strongly correlated with every
measure of socio-economic background than is high school rank.
Sturm & Guinier, supra note 3, at 988-89. Noting the income/SAT correlation as well,
Hacker attributes the lower performance of African Americans to their social isolation, which
results in "less ... exposure to the rules of 'linear reasoning' that are expected on SAT and IQ
tests." HACKER, supra note 59, at 151. Thus, the emphasis of standardized test scores allows
preferential allocation of higher education-a social component of fill citizenship-excluding
those who "develop alternative intellectual styles" in their isolation. Id.
68 "Most conservative Americans tend to disclaim responsibility for issues and tensions
associated with race.... In their view, black Americans .... for at least a generation, have
been given plenty of opportunities, so they have [only] themselves to blame for whatever dif-
ficulties they face." HACKER, supra note 59, at 55-56. Affirmative-action opponents attempt
to prove that race-based remedies are no longer needed by pointing to success stories such as
the growth of the African American middle class and the African American presence in key
government positions and various professions that were once exclusively relegated to the
white majority. But see id. at 112-13 (noting that, aside from entertainers, most African
Americans holding prominent positions are employed by governmental or public service enti-
ties, and observing that "the private sector has been less welcoming").
69 OLIVER & SHAPIRo, supra note 57, at 2.
70 Id. at 32.
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tage.7t Some who dispute the relation between wealth and economic power
argue that the two do not equate because "individuals with relatively little
wealth may... nonetheless exercise considerable economic power because
of their institutional positions. ' 72 This argument, however, presumes that
those with power based on institutional positions are secure and bear no risk
to their position regardless of the choices made in exercising their authority
and influence. Such security is usually guaranteed by financial independ-
ence; thus the significance of wealth is inevitable.
Oliver and Shapiro demonstrate that income alone does not predict
wealth. A comparison of income, net worth, and net financial assets for
black and white, middle-class workers shows that, although blacks in the
sample earned 70-85% of the income that whites earned, their net worth was
only 16-31% of whites' net worth, and their net financial assets were zero.73
Further, a comparison of black and white net worth for various scenarios
shows that there is a 74% differential in net worth between similar white
and black households that cannot be explained by age, work experience,
household size, or level of education. 74 More importantly, because wealth
encompasses resources and material assets that are transferred from genera-
tion to generation, thus having "historic origins, 75 a wealth-based analysis
of racial inequalities underscores the justice in reparations for a historic
wrong.76
71 This intergenerational transfer of wealth is a critical factor in determining social status.
This effect of wealth on generations is affirmed by looking at the backgrounds of the Nation's
wealthiest men. See id. at 29 (stating that "39% of the wealthiest men in America came from
the upper social class in 1900; by 1950, 68% of the richest men were born to wealth; and this
figure climbed to 82% by 1970").
72 Id. at31.
73 See id. at 97 (stating that, for example, a married white middle class couple has an av-
erage income of $32,400 and an average net worth of $65,024, but a similarly situated black
couple only has an average income of $25,848 and an average net worth of $17,437).
7 See id. at 202, 209 (noting that among the variables included in the analysis were age,
grade level completed, number of workers in the household, number of children in the house-
hold, and whether there was a white-collar worker in the household).
75 Id. at 2.
76 See id. at 160-70 (discussing how parental wealth affects net worth and net financial
assets for whites and blacks); see also WEST, supra note 55, at 63 ("The urgent problem of
black poverty is primarily due to the distribution of wealth, power and income-a distribution
influenced by the racial caste system that denied opportunities to most 'qualified' black peo-
ple until two decades ago."); infra Part IV.B (discussing reparations in the context of distribu-
tive justice).
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B. Beneath the Surface Status Quo
"[African American] conservatives and liberals alike... contend that
land and man's own self-contained sense of industry serve as the greatest
emancipators and equalizers of people in America."77  As key routes to
wealth, control of land and labor are cornerstones in a capitalistic society,
where political empowerment is closely tied to economic empowerment.
This connection between land/labor control and political voice manifests it-
self in voter districting 7 and lobbying, both of which directly impact state
and federal legislative and executive powers, which in turn control the ap-
pointment of judicial power. In areas where state and local judges are
elected, the ramifications of land/labor control extend directly to the state
judicial power.79 Thus, it is instructive to explore the connection between
historical race biases against African Americans and the status quo of
black/white inequalities by focusing on land ownership and entrepreneur-
ship.
1. Early Disenfranchisement
At the close of the Civil War, four million former slaves emerged from
"two and a half centuries of legalized oppression ... [to enter] Southern so-
77 M. Leo Owens, Vanishing Farmsteads: An Issue of Ownership, in ABOT ... TIME,
July 1993, at 10, 11.
78 Traditional voter districting principles include geographic "compactness, contiguity,
and respect for political subdivisions." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). Thus, the
ability to buy land in any district without restriction, as well as the ability to control the racial
population of district areas, impacts the strength of any groups political voice. See, e.g., id. at
642 (holding that although race conscious redistricting is not per se violative of the Equal
Protection Clause, "redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it ra-
tionally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without
regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification" is
violative); see also Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For Political Equality, 77
VA. L. REV. 1413, 1513-14 (1991) (advocating an at-large voting scheme and legislative rules
that allow cumulative voting and encourage consensus decisions to help equalize the position
of minorities and other underrepresented groups); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal
Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 333, 339-43 (1998) (advocating the use of non-traditional systems of vot-
ing, such as cumulative voting, limited voting, and preference voting, to enhance minority
representation).
79 This is the case in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Lou-
isiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
and Washington. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.14 (providing that "[v]acancies in
any judicial office shall be filled by appointment by the governor"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
17-103 (Michie 1994) ("The judge of a municipal court elected to that office by countrywide
vote ... must be a resident of the county in which the court sits.").
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ciety with little or no material assets."80 The majority of slaves had been
agricultural workers. 8 An estimated half million had experience in mining,
lumbering, railroad building, construction, and various craft occupations,
and of these, about 50,000 were engaged in manufacturing. 2 As previously
discussed, the Confiscation Act failed to help the majority of freed slaves to
secure land. 3 However, in 1866, the Southern Homestead Act "did provide
part of the basis for the fact that by 1900 one-quarter of Southern black
farmers owned their own farms."84 Those that had not secured their own
land entered the labor market; the competition was not welcomed by white
laborers, who were unwilling to admit African American workers to their
85unions. African Americans without land or alternative means were forced
to return to white-owned farms for meager monthly wages or a share of the
crop.86
Most Southern whites.., were convinced that laws should be speedily enacted
to curb blacks and to ensure their role as a laboring force in the South. These
laws, called Black Codes, bore a remarkable resemblance to the antebellum
Slave Codes... and can hardly be described as measures that respected the
rights of blacks as free individuals. Several of them undertook to limit the
areas in which blacks could purchase or rent property. Vagrancy laws imposed
heavy penalties that were designed to force all blacks to work whether they
wanted to or not. The control of blacks by white employers was about as great
as that which slaveholders had exercised. Blacks who quit their jobs could be
arrested and imprisoned for breach of contract. They were not allowed to tes-
tify in court except in cases involving members of their race. Numerous fines
were imposed for seditious speeches, insulting gestures or acts, absence from
work, violating curfew, and the possession of firearms. There was, of course,
80 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 13.
81 See MELVIN M. LEIMAN, THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM: A HISTORY 24-26
(1993) (characterizing the plantation as the "vital economic unit of the Southern political
economy").
82 See id. at 26 (discussing slavery and non-agricultural development).
83 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Confiscation Acts of
1861 and 1862); see also OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 14-15 (discussing the failures
and successes of land distribution during and immediately following the Civil War).
84 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 15.
85 See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 232-37 (discussing economic adjustments and
discrimination faced by the four million former slaves).
86 "Plantation wages ranged from $9 to $15 a month for men and from $5 to $10 for
women, in addition to food, shelter, and fuel." Id. at 234. As sharecroppers, "former slaves
were allowed from one-quarter to one-half of the cotton and corn; they were also provided
with a house, fuel, and in some cases food." Id. White employers "anxious to secure labor at
the lowest possible price" often entered into labor contracts with black workers only to disre-
gard their own obligations and enforce these contracts against the black workers. See id. at
232 (noting that although one of the services provided by the Freedmen's Bureau was assis-




no enfranchisement of blacks and no indication that in the future they could
look forward to full citizenship and participation in a democracy.
87
The enactment of Black Codes throughout various southern states ef-
fectively suppressed the free labor market.88 In response, Congress passed
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which provided that freed slaves born in the
United States were citizens entitled to the same rights and privileges as
white citizens.8 9  The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was de-
signed in part to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866.90 Once overt legis-
lative discrimination was outlawed, African American workers were able to
command wages more in line with the value of their labor.91  African
American workers began to migrate in search of better work and life op-
portunities.
92
Group migrations were significant for several reasons. First, such migrations
were sometimes a form of political protest, one of the few forms of protest in
which disenfranchised African-Americans could engage. African-Americans
frequently deserted regions in response to lynchings and other forms of white
lawlessness, or in response to unfavorable legislation. African-Americans
would move to places where they were relatively well treated or had relatively
good economic prospects.
93
White employers lobbied for facially neutral laws in an effort to stop
these migrations, because the ability to migrate gave great leverage to Afri-
87 Id. at 225.
88 See David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on
Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REv. 781, 787-88 (1998) ("In an at-
tempt to curtail the market for African-American labor... states and municipalities passed
'Black Codes' that regulated African-American labor. The more severe laws practically rec-
reated slavery for African-American agricultural workers by prescribing labor terms.").
89 These included the rights
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties,
and to none other ....
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §
18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870)) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1994)).
90 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTTrUTION 75 (1992) ("It was the de-
monstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 'constitutionalized' the Civil Rights Act of 1866.").
91 See Bernstein, supra note 88, at 788 (reporting that the removal of the Black Codes led
to a rise in wages for African Americans commensurate with the actual worth of their labor).
92 See id. at 783.
93 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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can American workers.94 Although some state supreme courts ruled that
these statutes were unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court held that they




Self-employment or entrepreneurship is a means of social mobility that
has become almost synonymous with the "American Dream." 96 African
American men are only 38% as likely as white men to be self-employed,97
and small businesses owned by African Americans account for approxi-
mately 2.4% of the Nation's corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietor-
ships.98 In an effort to bolster arguments that any disadvantage African
Americans now suffer is of their own making, affirmative-action opponents
are apt to point to the success of other non-European ethnic groups--espe-
cially the Japanese, Korean, and Jewish communities-in using self-
employment as a means to social and economic progression.99 The problem
with such a surface-level comparison is that it ignores the unique historic
94 See id. at 782-83, 793-99 (discussing the laws enacted in some states that taxed emi-
grant agents who worked to assist African American workers in finding and traveling to new
opportunities).
95 Id. at 781; see William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900) (holding that the emigrant agent
tax was not unconstitutional because the law's discrimination was based on reasonable
grounds and did not impermissibly interfere with freedom of transit or contract); Bernstein,
supra note 88, at 801 (noting that although "[tihe Alabama and North Carolina Supreme
Courts... [declared] such laws ... unconstitutional," a challenge to the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision to uphold that State's law, which imposed a tax on emigrant agents, led to
the unfavorable Supreme Court decision). Emigrant agents, persons engaged in hiring labor-
ers for employment outside their state of residence, played a major role in the migration of
African Americans because they "lowered the information costs of migration by using their
resources to advertise distant opportunities. Agents also often subsidized... [migration
costs] by either paying for or advancing the money for... train tickets" and "sometimes even
retirling] debts their recruits owed to plantation owners." Id. at 782 (footnotes omitted).
See HACKER, supra note 59, at 113 (discussing the "small business" sector as a route
to wealth and social status).
97 See id. at 114. The data reported (for men) shows self-employment rates of 20.3% for
Korean Americans and 12.9% for Iranian Americans-with both groups exceeding white
Americans at 9.5%. The statistics for other groups were 9.0% for Cuban Americans, 8.5% for
Japanese Americans, and 7.8% for Chinese Americans, compared to 3.6% for African Ameri-
cans, 3.7% for Filipino Americans, and 3.4% for Puerto Ricans. See id.
98 See id. at 113 (noting that the majority of these businesses are local enterprises servic-
ing African American clientele, and 85% of them are individually- or family-run).
99 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 45 (noting the frequent portrayal of African
Americans as the "ethnic group with the lowest rate and degree of success in using self-
employment as a means of social mobility").
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and still prevailing frustrations of African American entrepreneurial ef-
forts.
00
'Between 1867 and 1917 the number of [African] American enter-
prises increased from four thousand to fifty thousand."' 101 Three powerful
illustrations of early frustration thwarting that remarkable growth trend are
the race riots of Tulsa, Rosewood, and Wilmington. 10 2 The Tulsa riot took
place in the Greenwood district known as "Black Wall Street," an area in
which African Americans owned the land and independently operated the
district's businesses, schools, and banks.1 3  The "district encompassed
forty-one grocers and meat markets, thirty restaurants, fifteen physicians,
five hotels, two theaters, and two newspapers. The black community also
included many wealthy blacks who had invested in and profited from oil
leases."'1 4 Reportedly, the 1921 Tulsa race riot lasted for three days, as
whites "rampaged through the Greenwood district breaking into homes,
looting businesses and attacking any black person they saw."105 "At the
height of the melee, bundles of dynamite were dropped from an air-
plane[,] ... destroying everything."'1 6 The resulting damage, in addition to
fatalities, was the destruction of thirty-five city blocks, including 18,000 Af-
rican American homes, businesses, and churches. 10 7 "Afterward, more than
4000 blacks were interned on fairgrounds in cattle and hog pens."'08 Many
100 See id. ("This form of invidious comparison projects a whole range of 'positive' char-
acteristics onto those who have been successful... while casting African Americans as so-
cially deficient and constitutionally impaired when it comes to creating flourishing busi-
nesses.").
1l Id. at 48 (quoting JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP
AMONG BLACK-AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS (1991)).
102 Overt racist violence against African Americans by whites was quite common from
the turn of the century to the 1960s. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 312-54, 469,
509 (providing historical reports of mob violence, lynchings, and property bumings).
103 See Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day And White by (K)night: Regulating the Political
Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1079, 1080 n.1
(1996) (referencing SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE
RIOT OF 1921 (1982)).
104 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 49-50.
15 Cary Clack, What's The Interest Due On Justice?, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws,
Nov. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11503071 (reporting on the posthumous clearance of an
African American man, J.B. Stratford, who had been accused of inciting the riot). Apparently
the riot ensued when African Americans sought to protect an African American boy from be-
ing lynched because a white woman accused him of attacking her. See FRANKLIN & Moss,
supra note 5, at 352 (describing the riot); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 50 (same).
106 Barnes, supra note 103, at 1080 n.1.
107 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 50 (writing that there was extensive prop-
erty damage, and that many people were left dead or homeless); Clack, supra note 105.
108 Barnes, supra note 103, at 1080 n.1.
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of the district's members left the area, but some stayed and attempted to re-
build. 1"9
Rosewood, a relatively prosperous logging town of about 200 African
Americans in western Levy County, Florida, was destroyed by a mob of
white men who looted and killed, eventually burning down every home be-
longing to the blacks in the town. 1 In Wilmington, North Carolina, ac-
cording to one account, "'there was grumbling among white professional
classes' because... 'black entrepreneurs, located conspicuously downtown,
deprived white businessmen of legitimate sources of income to which they
thought they were entitled."""' The Wilmington Riot of 1898 "created an
'economic diaspora' in which black businessmen were forced to steal away
in the night," eventually relocating "to Northern and Southeastern cities."
' 1 2
These riots, all of which proceeded for days with no prohibitive state action,
caused the demise of entire cities and business districts that were owned and
populated by African Americans.1 3 The damage was not only the loss of
life and property, but also the loss of opportunity to prosper in a networked
environment, and the lost inheritance of future generations.114  Thus, al-
though African Americans have enjoyed some success despite the odds,1
15
109
[W]hite city officials attempted to replace the ... [district] with a railroad terminal
and other industrial facilities.... [and] adopted an ordinance requiring all new
buildings in the area to be fireproof. The effect of the ordinance was to prevent
some black Tulsans from rebuilding their burned homes where they had been be-
cause they could not afford to rebuild dwellings of two stories or more with the con-
crete, steel, or brick, required by the new ordinance.... [A] leading black attor-
ney .... filed suit .... [and] persuaded a three judge panel to strike down the
ordinance as an uncompensated taking of private property.
Paul Finkelman, Not Only The Judges' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as So-
cial Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 184-85 (1994) (book review) (footnotes and internal
quotations omitted).
l1o See Dan DeWitt, Revisiting Rosewood: Truth Be Told, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
21, 1997, at ID. (reporting on the 1923 Rosewood massacre and its portrayal in a 1997 film).
III OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 49 (quoting H. LEON PRATHER, WE HAVE
TAKEN A CITY (1984)).
112 Id. at 49; see FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing black disenfran-
chisement and patterns of violence at the turn of the century).
113 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 49 ("Once home to flourishing black busi-
nesses ... , these cities [where the riots happened] today retain no more than fleeting memo-
ries of a time ... washed away.., by the deadliest obstacle of all to black business, organized
violence.").
114 This is significant because of the ways in which nepotism, the "good ole boys net-
work," and wealth accumulation by inheritance have favored whites.
115 One such example is the business section of Durham, North Carolina known as
"Hayti." The Hayti district was home to North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company, a major
African American corporation. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 48-49. By 1949,
African Americans had established an enclave of over 300 businesses that served both African
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the instability of that success resulting from racist state policy, Jim Crow
segregation, systemic discrimination, and outright violence has had a sig-
nificant impact on efforts toward the economic empowerment of African
Americans.
116
3. The Plight of African American Farmers
Post-reconstruction efforts toward entrepreneurship and land acquisition
have been largely thwarted by lack of capital and access to financing, as
well as by limited access to information. In 1920, African Americans
owned fifteen million acres of land and 17.4% of farm operators were
black. 17 Today, however, African American farmers account for only 3%
of American farmers. 118 As of 1991, African Americans owned less than
four million acres of land, and, reportedly, face a possible annual average
loss of fifty thousand acres resulting in a projected net loss of $2.5 mil-
lion.119 The decline is attributed to a "lack of capital needed to expand pro-
duction capabilities through the purchase of increased acreage and new
forms of technology."
120
American and white markets. Although 1960s urban renewal destroyed one-third of the busi-
nesses and 600 homes, the district still exists today. See id. (comparing the survival of Hayti
with similar sections of Wilmington and Tulsa which were destroyed by organized violence).
116 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a Louisiana statute that re-
quired racial segregation of railroad passengers was constitutional and reasonable under the
circumstances), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); supra notes 88,
94-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Black Codes enacted in various states before
and after the abolition of slavery); infra text accompanying notes 125, 132, 134 (discussing
the racially biased implementation of government and institutional programs). As previously
discussed, entrepreneurial efforts and property gains by African Americans were thwarted by
white mob violence. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text (describing efforts at
entrepreneurship and the resistance and violence by whites). Individual and organized racist
acts by private citizens and by police officials permeate the experience of African Americans
to this day. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Sunlight on Police Racism, WASH. POST., Aug. 9, 1997, at
A19 (describing two fatal instances of race-based police brutality against African American
men and the beating of one grandmother, and noting that "[t]he extent of police brutality, es-
pecially against blacks, is not mentioned in any of the president's homilies on race relations");
Lola Smallwood, Cops Probe Dragging Of Black Teen, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1998, at 4 (re-
porting that an African American "teenager was allegedly dragged several blocks by
a... vehicle [driven] by three white men yelling racial slurs," only days after "three suspected
Ku Klux Klan members were arrested in Jasper, Texas" for dragging an African American
man for two miles, causing a brutal death by dismemberment); Allan Turner, Racial Hate
Crimes Sordid Part of State History, Hous. CHRoN., June 14, 1998, at 10, available in
1998 WVL 3582500 (citing four "high-profile" instances of racially motivated hate crimes
against African American men in Texas by police and state troopers).
117 See Owens, supra note 77, at 10.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 10-11.
120 Id. at 11.
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Recently, the National Black Farmer's Association launched a "grass-
roots battle against more than three decades of documented discrimination
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and its employees."'
121
Programs designed fifty to sixty years ago, "to provide technical assistance
to improve farm production, financial aid to help rural families acquire de-
cent housing and economically viable farms, and price supports to protect
farmers from the hazards of the market" have benefited white farmers to the
detriment of African American farmers. 122 Prior to the USDA's establish-
ment of a nondiscriminatory policy for federal programs in 1964, African
American farmers were largely unaware of these farm support programs and
opportunities. 123  Subsequently, although access to information has im-
proved, access to available loan dollars has still been hindered by wide-
spread discrimination. 124 Based on investigations of the Farmers Home
Administration ("FHA"), the USDA concluded that the FHA lending prac-
tices were influenced by "politics and racism. ' '12  The USDA has "frozen
foreclosures on farms where the owner has filed a discrimination complaint"
and legislation has been introduced "to prevent similar discrimination prac-
tices... in the future."'
126
4. Houses and Land
"Housing is... intimately connected with the quality of life since it is
closely linked with education," health, and welfare-all social components
of citizenship-as well as employment opportunities and income. 127 Varied
forms of racial discrimination in housing often exist in combination.
128
121 Kelley Smith, Black Farmers Have Beef With the USDA: Loan Denials Spark Legis-
lation Proposal to Protect African American Farmers, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1998, at
16, 16.
122 Valerie Grim, Black Participation in the Farmers Home Administration and Agricul-
tural Stabilization and Conservation Service, 1964-1990, 70 AGRIc. HiST. 321,321 (1996).
123 See id. at 322 (reporting that, prior to the civil rights movement, black farmers were
"largely disconnected" from these loans programs).
24 See id. at 325-28 (reporting the severely low number and size value of loans made to
African American farmers during the 1980s).
125 See id. at 329-30 (discussing how the FHA failed to achieve the goals of reaching out
to minority farmers with information and help).
126 Smith, supra note 121, at 16-17; see USDA Accountability and Equity Act of 1997,
H.R. Res. 2185, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing that both customers and employees of the De-
partment of Agriculture be treated more fairly).
127 LEIMAN, supra note 81, at 135. "Housing discrimination... creates defacto school
segregation, which tends to reinforce racial economic differences." Id.
See id. at 136 (describing how "[t]hese multifarious forms of housing discrimina-




They include more structurally substandard housing among blacks than
whites; higher rent for black ghetto residents for equal or poorer facilities;
three to four times more "overcrowding in the ghetto... which has been
intensified rather than lessened by urban renewal"; 129 higher prices for mer-
chandise sold to ghetto residents "caught in a captive market";130 compro-
mised access to employment opportunities in expanding suburban industrial
parks, as a result of barriers to acquiring suburban housing; and premiums
charged to black homeowners seeking to buy into white or mixed areas.
131
In addition, a disproportionate share of hazardous waste landfills and facili-
ties are located in areas predominately populated by African Americans.
1 32
Another prevalent form of housing discrimination against African
Americans is banking discrimination and redlining. 133 "A 1991 Federal Re-
serve study of 6.4 million home mortgage applications by race and income
confirmed suspicions of bias in lending by reporting a widespread and sys-
temic pattern of institutional discrimination in the nation's banking sys-
tem. 134 This study showed that African American applicants are denied
loans two to three times more often than white applicants; high-income Af-
rican Americans are declined loans more often that low-income whites;
mortgage rates for African Americans are 5.4 points higher for federal pro-
gram loans, and 9.2 points higher for conventional loans compared to
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See id. (noting that "the greater difficulty of acquiring housing in the suburban areas
cut many blacks off from employment opportunities in the expanding industrial parks in the
suburbs"); see also Michelle Adams, Separate and [UnJequal: Housing Choice, Mobility,
and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 427-30
(1996) (discussing the specific kinds of harm caused by pervasive housing discrimination
against African Americans).
132 See Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice: Constitutional and Statutory Challenges
to Environmental Racism, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIvING CONsTTrUTION 270,
272-74 (John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995) (discussing the findings of
several studies that show evidence of environmental racism).
For instance, a study of municipal incinerators and municipal and private landfills
concluded that although African Americans constituted only 28 percent of the
population of Houston, Texas, in 1980, six of the city's eight incinerators, five of the
six state-permitted municipal landfill sites, and all five of the unpermitted municipal
landfill sites were located in predominately African American neighborhoods.
Id. at 273. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the Environmental Protection
Agency, a federal agency, "discriminates against minority communities in the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites." Id. (discussing the findings of an investigation of U.S. environmental
lawsuits from 1985 to 1991) (citing Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection:
The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2).
133 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 19 (describing how banking discrimination
and redlining used to be confined to African Americans seeking to buy homes in white areas,
but now affects African Americans seeking to buy homes anywhere).
134 Id.
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whites; and these trends are present regardless of the area in which African
Americans seek to buy homes.
1 35
C. The Effect on Full Citizenship
"The essence of equal [or full] citizenship is the dignity of full member-
ship in the society." 136 This membership necessarily entails a civil or legal
component, a political component, and a social component. 137  The civil
component refers to an individual's security in the basic rights and liberties
derived from the societal values reflected in the Bill of Rights and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments: the right to secure one's self and property;
freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and association; and "both substan-
tive and procedural equality before the law." 138 The political component is
essentially democratic enfranchisement-participation in the governmental
process through the right to a "formal voice in the selection of leadership"
and the right to "attempt to influence policy."'139 The social component
concerns welfare and general well-being, or those resources and capacities
required to secure the "opportunity to express and implement the [civil and
political] rights derived from ... societal values."
140
The social component includes health, education, and welfare, and
"presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an individual ... as a
member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant.'' a Thus,
the social component addresses social status.1 42 Theoretically, "the societal
135 See id. at 137, 142 (highlighting the differential treatment of African Americans in
obtaining mortgages and loans).
136 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv 1, 5 (1977).
137 See id. (discussing citizenship and equal protection under the 14th Amendment, as
well as under the Fifth Amendment as it pertains to federal limitations); Parsons, supra note
12, at 1009, 1017 (analyzing the inclusion problem for African Americans as compared to
other groups that have faced discrimination in America).
138 Parsons, supra note 12, at 1017. "These rights are to take precedence over any par-
ticular political status or interest and over any social component such as wealth or poverty,
prominence or obscurity." Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1017-18.
141 Karst, supra note 136, at 6; see Parsons, supra note 12, at 1017 (specifying the ele-
ments of health, education, and welfare).
142 Karst presents a "well-being" perspective of equal citizenship. He posits that the
principle of equal citizenship embodies 'an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem,"' Karst,
supra note 136, at 6 (quoting JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUsTICE 256 (1971)), and "guards
against degradation or the imposition of stigma," id., because the "relationship between
stigma and inequality is... clear. while not all inequalities stigmatize, the essence of any
stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is regarded as an unequal in some respect.'
Id, Here, stigma is defined not by "the subjective reaction of one who feels stigmatized, but
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community defines and presents standards for the allocation of resources to
the community as a whole."'143 That allocation translates into "the definition
of the terms on which capacities, as matched with opportunities, can be in-
volved in the process of inclusion."'
144
In practice, white males with wealth and influence have controlled this
process. Consequently, the creation and protection of full citizenship de-
pends on not only the formal equality of legal and political rights, but also
on the prohibition of the subtle disenfranchisement that would render those
rights moot. 145  Underlying the concept of full membership in a societal
community is the notion of "solidarity or mutual loyalty of its members"
and a sense of "commitment of the members to the collectivity in which
they are associated.' 46 For Americans, this notion translates into a national
patriotism that supersedes state and local affiliations, as well as a mutual re-
spect and priority for each individual's rights, regardless of the individual's
race, ethnicity, or gender.
The prevailing condition for African Americans, however, is one of ex-
clusion, not inclusion. Illustrations in the context of education alone include
the proven bias of standardized tests used in university admissions;"47 the
poor quality of public education in predominately African American com-
by the attitudes of the general society, or a significant portion of society, toward persons with
a particular characteristic." Id. at 6 n.25. Karst describes the "injurious effects of stigmatiz-
ing inequalities [as] both psychological and tangible.... [If internalized] as an index of per-
sonal worth, [inequality] directly harms the [Rawlsian] primary good of self-respect." Id. at
6-7. This analysis is similar to that which the Warren Court adopted in Brown v. Board of
Education: "To separate [children in grade and high schools] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds... [and] 'motivation ... to learn."'
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citation omitted).
143 Parsons, supra note 12, at 1018.
144 Id. A ready example of this is the use of standardized tests by most colleges and uni-
versities and some employers, to assess the qualifications of applicants. See, e.g., Sturm &
Guinier, supra note 3, at 983-96 (discussing the underinclusiveness of standardized tests used
for college, law school, and employment).
145 See FONER, supra note 7, at 133 (noting that immediately following the abolition of
slavery, Thaddeus Stevens, who was a congressional advocate for equal rights for African
Americans, did not support the immediate grant of voting rights). Foner states that "Stev-
ens.., challenged the idea that the impoverished and despised former slaves could immedi-
ately become independent voters" without first being "given the economic wherewithal to es-
tablish their independence from economic coercion." Id.
146 Parsons, supra note 12, at 1009-10.
147 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 3, at 988-89 (showing data that demonstrates that for
each racial and ethnic group and gender, the "'[a]verage family income rises with each 100-
point increase in SAT scores, except for the highest SAT category where the number of cases
is smallo." (footnote omitted)).
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munities; 14 and the monocultural emphasis in educational materials that
neglects the African American presence and contribution. 149 Statistics re-
flecting disproportionate numbers of African American prisoners,150 dispa-
rate sentencing, 151 and lingering blatant discrimination in the private and
government sectors 152 call into question even the surety of the civil compo-
nent of full citizenship, substantive and procedural equality before the law.
Further, the political component has been and still is retarded by the nulli-
fying effects of various voting practices on the African American vote and a
stifled African American participation in the lobbying process.1 53 Thus, Af-
rican Americans as a group still do not enjoy the dignity of full membership
in the American community.
148 See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 83-132 (1991) (describing a case study of inequalities in public education in New
York).
149 See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 59, at 172-73 (discussing the domination of the "Euro-
American monocultural perspective" in school curricula).
150 See id. at 246 (listing the ratio of African American prisoners to the African American
population as approximately 3.8 for the Nation, and between 4 and 18 for the 13 states above
the national ratio).
151 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (considering evidence of racial
disparities in death penalty sentencing).
152 See, e.g., supra note 18; infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (documenting the
increase in employment discrimination despite the existence of affirmative-action programs).
153 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Note, The Emptiness Of Majority Rule, I MICH. J. RACE &
L. 195, 210-11 (1996) (discussing various voting practices that were developed to circumvent
the letter and spirit of the Voting Rights Act).
"Candidate diminution," as an example, involved the abolition of political offices,
the extension of terms for White incumbents, and the imposition of "stiff formal re-
quirements for qualifying to run in primaries or general elections, e.g., high filing
fees, numerous nominating petitions or complex oaths." Another such practice, that
of vote dilution, was just as perverse. Some of its manifestations included: racial
gerrymandering; decreasing the black proportion in a town or county by annexation,
deannexation, or consolidation; imposing a majority runoff requirement, which can
enable white voters to mobilize behind a single white candidate in the runoff after
having split their votes among several whites in the first election; holding at-large
rather than district elections, which allows white voters to overwhelm black ones
when the latter are in the minority; enacting such devices as full-slate laws, num-
bered-place laws, and staggered terms, all of which can, under some circumstances,
preclude the use of "single shot" voting by blacks, a strategy that can help them in
at-large systems to elect black candidates; and "splitting the vote for a strong black
candidate by nominating additional blacks as 'straw' candidates for the same office."
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). For examples of empowering alternatives to these prac-
tices, see Guinier, supra note 78, and Mulroy, supra note 78.
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III. WHY REPARATIONS?
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liber-
ate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free
to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.
154
President Clinton's charge to the Race Advisory Board narrows the fo-
cus to "recent... race relations," suggesting that the racial tensions that ex-
ist today have little to do with American history that is not "recent.' 155 Af-
firmative action is preferred over revisiting the past.15 6 Affirmative action
has been helpful in forcing access for a small number of individuals to cer-
tain educational and economic venues, but it does not effectively level the
playing field for African Americans as a collective race. 1 7 Indeed, one
general justification for affirmative action, as a "corrective for the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination," is that, "against the backdrop of a terri-
ble history of oppressive color conscious discrimination[,] ... immediate
colorblindness would perpetuate exclusion and be unfair."15' Given the
historical severity of the black-white relationship, is it really feasible to
move forward without looking back? Or is healing the racial divide, with-
out addressing the underlying sources of racial animosities, as unlikely as
healing a festering wound by applying bandages, without first cleaning
away the infectious pus? Seemingly, these questions are rhetorical. Nev-
ertheless, although apologies and reparations have been extended for lesser
atrocities, 159 the idea of extending the same to African Americans for slav-
154 President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Speech at Howard University
Commencement (June 4, 1965), reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANcEY, THE
MOYNIAN REPORT AND THE PoLmcs OF CONTROVERSY 125, 126 (1967).
155 See Exec. Order No. 13,050, 3 C.F.R 207, 207-08 (1997) (directing the President's
Advisory Board on Race to "[i]ncrease the Nation's understanding of our recent history of
race relations").
156 See, e.g., Clinton Refuses Reparations for Slavery, Clinton Calls for 'Repairing,' Not
Repaying, FLA. TODAY, June 17, 1997, at 3A, available in 1997 WL 11480352 [hereinafter
Clinton Refuses Reparations] (reporting President Clinton's preference for continued affirma-
tive action in the absence of an effective alternative).
157 See WEST, supra note 55, at 63 ("[D]efacto affirmative action measures... [such as]
contracts, jobs[,] ... subsidies to certain farmers[, and] FHA mortgage loans to specific
homebuyers ... have been based on preferential policies .... [that] benefit middle-class
Americans disproportionately.").
158 EDLEY, supra note 19, at 77 (quoting a memorandum on affirmative action from Pro-
fessor Paul Gewirtz of the Yale Law School to President Clinton and others).
159 See supra Part IV.C (discussing reparations to Japanese Americans and Aleuts). In
May 1997, President Clinton apologized, on behalf of the United States government, to survi-
vors of "The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male." See Carl M. Cannon,
Survivors of Tuskegee Study Get Apology, BALTIMORE SUN, May 17, 1997, at IA, available
in 1997 WL 5511866 (reporting that, since the government had already paid court-ordered
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ery and the related continuing discrimination is still met with resistance, de-
spite President Clinton's acknowledgment and informal apology to sub-
Saharan Africa for America's part in the slave trade. 6  One articulation of
the reluctance is that "'[i]t's been so long, and we're so many generations
removed"'; 161 another expressed reluctance, which has also been stated in
opposition to affirmative action, is that African American reparations would
do more to incite racial tensions than to resolve them. 62 Both excuses ig-
nore the equitable rationale for the continuing-wrongs doctrine--"when
[wrongful] conduct continues[,] ... repose is outweighed by the interest in
securing compensation for serious harm." 163 The latter "public popular con-
sensus" rationale ignores the power of Congress and the judiciary to rectify
even that which the majority population seeks to uphold-the very power
damages, the apology was "intended... to set a tone of redemption for Clinton's foray into
the often explosive area of racial disharmony").
In no way is the reference to "lesser atrocities" meant to belittle the experience of the
Japanese American, the Aleuts, or the Tuskegee experiment victims. The point here is to un-
derscore the weakness of a policy that selectively addresses some past harms, but glosses over
the continuum of harms to African Americans, based on a rationale that the magnitude of the
damages for African Americans is just too great.
House Concurrent Resolution 96, introduced in June 1997, calls for an apology to Af-
rican Americans whose ancestors suffered as slaves under the Constitution and laws of the
United States until 1865. See H.R. Con. Res. 96, 105th Cong. (1997). During President
Clinton's recent visit to various sub-Saharan African nations, the President spoke in Uganda
about how wrong America was to be involved in the slave trade. See Nancy Mathis, President
Acknowledges U.S. 'Sins' Against Africa, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 25, 1998, at IA, available
in 1998 WL 5084860. However, the same expression on American soil does not appear to be
forthcoming:
[M]ost of my African American friends and advisors don't believe that we should
get into what was essentially a press story about whether there should be an apology
for slavery in America. They think that that's what the 13th, 14th, and 15th amend-
ment was [sic]; they think that's what the civil rights legislation was; and they think
we need to be looking toward the future.
Interview by Ebony, Jet, and American Urban Radio Network with President William J.
Clinton, Cape Town, South Africa (Mar. 27, 1998), available in 1998 WL 158707 (quoting
President Clinton's answer to a question about his emphatic resistance to apologizing to Afri-
can Americans for slavery).
161 Clinton Refuses Reparations, supra note 156 (quoting Interview by Urban Radio
Network with President William J. Clinton (radio broadcast, June 16, 1997)); see also Verdun,
supra note 7, at 607 (noting perceptions that current-day African Americans do not deserve
reparation, since all ex-slaves are dead and current day "white Americans living today have
not injured African Americans and should not be required to pay for the sins of their slave-
master forbearers").
162 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 189 (noting that among the objections to
reparations is that "[t]hey may inflame more racial antagonism than they extinguish").
163 Peggy L. Miller, Repeated Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Continuing-Wrong Doc-
trine & Personal Injury Claims, 9 T.M. COOLEY L. REv 369,376-77 (1992).
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that the Supreme Court confirmed in the racial context in Brown v. Board of
Education.'
64
A. Race-Neutrality, Meritocracy, and Remediation
Presumably, merit is understood as achievement based on functional
capacity165-or intellect and hard work. Three elements at the core of the
"moral claim for the merit principle" are: maximization of efficiency and
social welfare; entitlement to decisions based on "individual desert" and
"personal qualities," rather than "social or political conventions tied to
group identity"; and alignment of "incentives so as to promote and reinforce
both autonomy and personal responsibility."'166 This argument, however, is
flawed in several respects. Two problems with the meritocratic argument
are that: first, it wrongly assumes that merit is something that can be con-
sistently measured between individuals under any circumstances; 167 and
second, it assumes that all have fair access to opportunity, dismissing the
evidence that, as a collective, African Americans continue to suffer harms
of past and present discriminations. 168 A third problem is that the meri-
tocratic argument ignores the relation between economic empowerment and
political empowerment, and thus fails to address the problem of access to
full citizenry.16 In actuality, each individual's access to success and well-
being in a capitalistic economy is tied to the accumulated wealth and op-
portunities enjoyed by past generations, both of which directly impact po-
litical influence.
70
164 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation in public schools violated the 14th
Amendment right to equal protection despite popular and state government support for segre-
gation).
16s Cf Sturm & Guinier, supra note 3, at 968-80 (challenging "the claim that the conven-
tional 'meritocracy' functions to identify those who can best perform").
166 EDLEY, supra note 19, at 143 (emphasis omitted).
167 See id. at 80, 143-50 (discussing the true complexity of merit and opportunity); Sturm
& Guinier, supra note 3, at 1035 (asserting that proponents of merit-based decision making
erroneously equate high numerical rankings with merit).
168 Hearings on H.R 2128, supra note 19, at 132 (testimony of Jorge Amselle, Commu-
nications Director, Center for Equal Opportunity) (arguing that the justification of affirmative
action as historical reparations "is applicable almost exclusively to Blacks only
[and] ... ignores the reality that not all Blacks are still suffering from the effects of America's
shameful past").
169 See Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to Afri-
can American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA.
L. REV. 863, 875 (1993) (discussing the ideal society reforms "necessary to ensure the repre-
sentation of African-Americans of all economic classes within political debates").
170 See supra text accompanying notes 69-76 (discussing intergenerational wealth and the
relation between economic power and political power).
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A clear warning of the inevitable failure of meritocracy in a society still
prone to racial discrimination comes from tester studies in which black and
white applicants are given identical fabricated credentials and sent on inter-
views seeking employment, loans, or housing. Studies showed that, even
for blue-collar jobs, black applicants were 20-25% less likely to advance in
the hiring process.171 Black applicants also faced discrimination in contacts
with realtors, 172 and are declined for loan approvals at disparate rates.
173
Despite any claim to the contrary, white Americans simply have an unfair
advantage over African Americans that bears no relation to their individual
character or qualifications.
Thus, a true meritocracy cannot be achieved unless everyone starts with
a clean slate or, at least, a fair allocation of the basic resources that ensure
full citizenship. 174 "Affirmative action is not the most important issue for
[African American] progress in America, but it is part of a redistributive
chain that must be strengthened if we are to confront and eliminate black
poverty [and disenfranchisement]. 175
B. The Moral Economy Incentive
176
If "the success of the moral economy of restitution ' 177 is measured "by
the degree to which it enables the victims to claim a share of the economic
pie .. and legitimize their side of history," 178 then America cannot achieve
171 See EDLEY, supra note 19, at 48-49 (citing tester case results from studies conducted
by the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington during 1990-92 and the Urban Insti-
tute's Employment and Housing Discrimination Studies in 1991).
172 See id. at 49 (noting that the Urban Institute's study revealed discrimination in
"roughly half of all contacts" for African Americans and discussing research conducted by the
Justice Department that documented numerous instances in which white applicants were
shown apartments after black applicants had been told that there were no vacancies).
173 See supra notes 123-25, 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination in
governmental loans and grants to African American farmers and would-be homeowners).
174 Admittedly, a "clean slate" is radical; but redistribution to ensure access to full par-
ticipation and the basic liberties that come with full citizenship is not.
175 WEST, supra note 55, at 65.
176 In a moral economy, restitution "attempts to rectify historical injustices and facilitate
higher awareness of public morality through the use of market mechanisms." Barkan, supra
note 1, at 53. The rationale works when a recognition of both parties' histories would be
beneficial and lead to the transfer of economic resources. See id. "[A]greements ... are en-
tered into voluntarily .... [But] this willingness ... often results from political pressure, or
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an equitable multicultural society without granting reparations to African
Americans.
179
Whether through active military involvement, international trade sanc-
tions, or diplomatic mediation, the U.S. government has a history of actively
advocating human rights and democracy in the international arena. In-
creasingly, the principle of restitution is forming the "basis for a new
worldwide moral economy,"'180 in which the empowered global market sup-
ports restitution as moral atonement for "wrongs of one people against an-
other."'' 1 A familiar example of the global trend toward nations compen-
sating victims because of political pressure is the German grant of
reparations to Jewish Holocaust survivors.18 2  A more recent example is
Japanese reparations to Korean "comfort women."183 There has also been a
rash of public apologies: from President Clinton to native Hawaiians; from
Poland to Jews for a massacre in 1946; from Canada to Canadian-
Ukrainians for maltreatment during World War I.1
4
Quite significant is President Clinton's apology to sub-Saharan African
nations for the role of the United States in the slave trade.1ls The timing of
this apology and the African Growth and Opportunity Act is reminiscent of
the circumstances surrounding the reparations for Japanese Americans and
179 See id. at 54, 57.
18O Id. at 52.
181 Id. at 52. See generally THEO VAN BovEN ET AL., SEMINAR ON T-E RIGHT TO
RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION, AND REHABILITATION (1992) (including various writings that
discuss rights of victims who have suffered gross violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms).
182 See generally NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS (1980) (tracing the negotiations between Jewish survivors and Germany be-
fore and after World War II). The United States has also intervened to secure reparations for
Jewish Americans. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (noting the intervention by the U.S. Department of State, the New Jersey congres-
sional delegation, and the Clinton administration on behalf of one Jewish American); see also
Grunfeder v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that reparations payments
from Germany to Holocaust survivors do not constitute income for the purpose of determining
Social Security Insurance benefits).
183 Cf Shibata Tetsuji, Japan's New Nationalism: It Has Wide Sources of Support and
Uses the Media Well, ASiAWEEK, May 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10819277 (noting that
in 1993 the Japanese government apologized for "this past action" and allocated funds to be
distributed to every victim).
184 See Barkan, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that "the most egregious injustices remain in
the collective memory").
185 See supra note 160 (discussing President Clinton's apology during his visit to sub-
Saharan African nations).
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"pro-Japan trade policies."'186 "For Congress, lingering animosity over the
[internment] of Japanese-Americans during World War II may have been
viewed by some as a barrier to effective economic relations between Japan
and the United States."187 Similarly, the coincidence of President Clinton's
apology with the African Growth and Opportunity Act is, perhaps, the epit-
ome of bartering guilt for economic gain because the Act provides for a
"new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa."188 Furthermore,
the African Growth and Opportunity Act includes a provision deeming in-
eligible those countries that are "determined by the President to engage in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights." 189 Absent at least a symbolic atonement for slavery, the United
States could not seek to impose such a moral provision regarding trade with
Africa without appearing hypocritical. The apology to Africa, however, is
meaningless without redress for African Americans. It would be a double
standard if America does not grant reparations to African Americans who
have suffered through the many dehumanizing experiences that litter the Af-
rican American experience.
IV. IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION
While [African Americans] may be justified in seeking redress for past and
present injustices, it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the re-
quested relief. The legislature rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate fo-
rum for plaintiff's grievances.§O
A. Procedural Barriers to Individual Suits
As there is no statutory ground for pursuing African American repara-
tions through the courts, the alternative lies in tort. In theory, there are sev-
eral potential tort suit scenarios. The plaintiff could be an individual Afri-
186 See Magee, supra note 169, at 909 ("The favorable congressional response to the
Japanese-American case for reparations unfolded contemporaneously with the pro-Japan trade
policies of the Reagan Administration.").
187 Id. at 908-09.
188 See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. (1998). Unfortunately, the African American case for
reparations currently lacks the support of an empowered player in the global economy that
could provide the exterior political incentive for theUnited States to pass the African Ameri-
can reparations legislation. See Magee, supra note 169, at 909 (noting that "no leverage-laden
tie to political or economic power exists between the descendants of American slaves and a
'first world' economic power").
189 H.R. 1432 § 4(d).
190 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting dicta from Judge
Armstrong's district court order of dismissal).
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can American or a class of African Americans. The defendant could be an
individual white American, a class of white Americans, the government as a
surrogate for white Americans, 191 or the government as a wrongdoer in its
own right. A suit in tort for African American reparations, however, is
plagued with procedural problems that have proven dispositive. 192 Some of
the problems were illustrated by the first federal appellate court case to be
heard on African American reparations--Cato v. United States. In Cato, the
plaintiffs sued the United States seeking damages for past and present in-
justices related to ancestral slavery. They also sought an acknowledgment
of and apology for discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants
from the end of the Civil War to the present.193 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal, finding that the complaint did not state a le-
gally cognizable claim and could not be cured by amendment.
9 4
Without consent to suit in an action to which the federal government is
a party, federal jurisdiction is limited to those claims "arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."' 95 Moreover, sovereign
immunity bars any suit against the United States, unless a waiver is '"une-
191 For a discussion of the government as a surrogate for individual wrongdoers, see gen-
erally RAWLS, supra note 142.
192 See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1110-11 (dismissing a reparations claim for lack of an arguable
basis in law, lack of federal jurisdiction, and preclusion by sovereign immunity); Trice v.
United States, No. C 94-1474 BAC, 1994 WL 225179, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1994) (same);
see also Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp 769, 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
multiple claims in a class-action suit for reparations to former Japanese American internees
were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and/or the statute of limitations).
193 See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106 (describing the complaint as seeking compensation "for
forced, ancestral indoctrination into a foreign society; kidnapping of ancestors from Africa;
forced labor;... removal of traditional values; deprivations of freedom; and imposition of
oppression, intimidation, miseducation and lack of information about various aspects of their
indigenous character"). The complaints in Cato and Trice mirrored the language of the pro-
posed bill for African American reparations, which had been introduced to Congress three
times at the time these suits were filed. See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for
African Americans Act, H.R. 40, 105th Cong. § 2(b) (1997).
194 See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106, 1111 (affirming the district court's dismissal of Cato's
complaint). Cato had filed pro se, in forma pauperis on behalf of herself and three other fam-
ily members, so the court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994). See
Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105, 1106, 1111.
195 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). The "treaty" language eliminated the jurisdictional issue for
most Native American claims for restitution. This is an important distinction which has pre-
cluded the use of Native American reparations as precedent for African American reparations.
See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108.
IT]here is nothing in the relationship between the United States and any other per-
sons, including African American slaves and their descendants, that is legally com-
parable to the unique relationship between the United States and Indian Tribes.
Courts have recognized fiduciary responsibilities running from the United States to
Indian Tribes because of specific treaty obligations and a network of statutes ....
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quivocally expressed.' ' 196 Even under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
gives federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States
"for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945,"'197 a tort claim
based on slavery would be barred unless the plaintiff could show: (1) that
the continuing violations doctrine applies because African Americans are
still impacted by the legacy of slavery and subsequent systemic discrimina-
tion; 19 and (2) continuing wrongful acts by the government.
199
Without the government as a defendant, "rights theory has made tradi-
tional remedies law a virtual obstacle course for racial remedies theo-
rists.,,200  Generally, we2°I believe group responsibility and group entitle-
ment are not appropriate when "individuals are defined and treated as part
of a group whose behavior they do not necessarily endorse or have signifi-
cant control over."202 This is especially so when the group is defined by an
immutable characteristic such as race.
203
Verdun's analysis of the rights theory in terms of the dominant (white
American) perspective versus the African American consciousness provides
an interesting synopsis of why the standing doctrine and causation doctrine
204are barriers to African American reparations suits in tort. The dominant
196 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King,
395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
197 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
198 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, § 2401(b), bars any claim against the United States not
brought within two years after the accrual of the harm. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
Therefore, in order to avoid this statute of limitations problem, the plaintiff must utilize the
continuing wrong doctrine. Under the doctrine, it is not enough that the harm continues, but
rather "there must be a continuing wrongful act ... [and] a continuing relationship to estab-
lish an on-going duty and breach of that duty." Miller, supra note 163, at 376. "mhe con-
tinuing-wrong doctrine has been embraced where it logically applies, and rejected when it
does not," so that it has traditionally applied to allow recovery for tortious conduct causing
property or personal injury claims. Id. In Cato, the Court recognized the applicability of this
doctrine to the slavery-based claim; however, the court refused to rule on the doctrine's appli-
cability to the case as presented. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108-09.
199 For an argument for reparations based on continuing governmental violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see BORIS I. BrIKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973). But see
Magee, supra note 169, at 903 (criticizing Bitker for failing to counter the problems of sover-
eign immunity, the Ith Amendment, standing, ripeness, and statue of limitations).
200 Magee, supra note 169, at 907.
201 Here, "we" is the "broad American legal and non-legal populus."
202 FISCUS, supra note 67, at 9.
203 See id. (stating that general beliefs do not approve of group entitlements, especially
when individuals are not free to withdraw from that group).
204 See Verdun, supra note 7, at 619-29 (describing the independent perspective as one of
individualism and self-determination and comparing that with the African American perspec-
tive that focuses on group identification); cf Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Criti-
cal Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 375 (1987) (naming the
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group embraces the rights theory and "perceives that each individual is re-
sponsible for his or her own behavior."205 From their perspective, vicarious
liability for the actions of others is only applicable where the person as-
suming responsibility has control over the offender; if no such control rela-
tionship exists, then there is no legal or moral responsibility for the actions
of others.206 In contrast, Verdun posits that, "African American conscious-
ness emphasizes the significance of group identification .... Cooperation
through collective efforts is the accepted means of achieving culturally pre-
scribed goals."207  Verdun argues that society at large is the appropriate
wrongdoer, because "[s]ociety, propelled by a set of values that were mani-
fested in the laws, allowed the injury to take place and remain uncompen-
sated for generations. ''208 The African American consciousness justifies so-
ciety as the appropriate wrongdoer because "[s]ociety, unlike individuals,
does not have a natural life," and "[t]he society that committed the wrong is
still thriving."
209
For reparation suits, the rights theory affects the ability to establish
standing, as well as causation. Although past affirmative-action cases have
not required plaintiffs to prove that they were the ones actually harmed by
the wrongful act,210 the courts, in alignment with the dominant perspective,
have shown an unwillingness to let anyone other than the actual wrongdoer
plaintiffs in a claim for reparations as "victim group members" and the defendants as "perpe-
trator descendants and current beneficiaries of [the] past injustice").
205 Verdun, supra note 7, at 619-20.
206 See id. at 620 ("Vicarious responsibility for the behavior of others only extends to
individuals controlled by the persons assuming the responsibility.").
207 Id. at 625.
209 Id. at 637. In general, the norms and values of American society include an inherent
racism that casts African Americans in an inferior light, which, in turn, provides inherent
privilege to whites. See id. at 634 ("[S]ubconsciously, many decisions, heavily camouflaged
in the cloak of meritocracy, are made based on. . . beliefs [that African Americans are inferior
to whites]."). Moreover, many people have "enjoyed an increased status and standard of liv-
ing because of the national economic stability generated in part by the institution of slavery."
Id. at 636.
209 Id. at 637-38.
210 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that "[r]acial characteristics may serve to define a group of persons who have
suffered a special wrong and who, therefore, are entitled to special reparations"); cf Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (finding that even if Bakke, a white
medical school applicant, could not "prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of
the special program, it would not follow that he lacked standing. The constitutional element
of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed
by favorable decision of his claim").
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assume or accept responsibility for compensation. 211 Accordingly, the death
of the last slave and slaveholder made reparations through judicial relief
moot.212 One could imagine the courtroom argument: "To hold that de-
scendants of the millions of blacks harmed throughout our history are enti-
tled to compensation for the long-past injury of their ancestors"213 violates
the principle that the parties compensated should be the parties harmed;
214
likewise, to hold that the "current generations of whites should pay for the
sins of earlier generations of whites" 21 necessarily violates the principle
that only those parties that caused the harm should compensate the plain-
tiffs.216 Thus, cases based in tort necessarily fail for lack of standing and/or
causation. Therefore, the tort suit as a vehicle for African American repara-
tions is not a viable option.
B. Distributive Justice
As happens with affirmative action, any legislative reparations scheme
would at least indirectly impact the white American population. The tax
dollars from all citizens fund the government, and government resources-
such as land, employment, and education accommodations-must be
shared. Outside the litigation context, however, "[g]roup responsibility and
group entitlement are appropriate when the characteristic defining the group
is of primary relevance to the reward or punishment in question, and when
the group behavior can be said to be the product of voluntary effort by the
individuals who comprise it."217  "Individuals who have not personally
harmed minorities may nevertheless be prevented from reaping the benefits
of the harm inflicted by the society at large."
218
211 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("[A]s the basis
for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal dis-
crimination is insufficient and over-expansive.").
212 See Fiscus, supra note 67, at 9-11 (discussing the two objections to the compensatory
justice argument for affirmative action which are grounded in the compensatory principles).
213 Id. at 10.
214 See id. at 9-11.
215 Id. at 10.
216 See id. at 9-11; see also Miller, supra note 163, at 376 (discussing the requirement of
the doctrine of continuing wrong that there be a continuing relationship between the wrong-
doer and the plaintiff"to establish an on-going duty and breach of that duty").
217 FISCUs, supra note 67, at 9-11 (emphasis added).
218 Id. at 38 (arguing that the rights of whites are not violated by acting to restore the
equilibrium that would have existed absent racist conditions); see also EDLEY, supra note 19,
at 244-54 (discussing how most people would agree on the ideal result of eliminating racism,
but that they disagree on the means of attaining that end, and describing how the rhetoric of
arguing "rights" creates a trap that destroys all discussions).
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This is the nature of distributive justice. According to fights theorist
Robert Nozick, "If the world were wholly just .... [t]he complete principle
of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone
is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution." '219 The de-
termination results from a three-step induction:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle ofjustice
in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle ofjustice
in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the
holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of I and
2.220
The relevance of this entitlement theory to reparations for African
Americans is the inherent use of historical information, which extends the
analysis to the intergenerational transfer of wealth and opportunity. Redis-
tribution in the context of reparations does not mean a radical redistribution
of wealth from the rich to the poor; rather, it is more a legitimate realloca-
tion of that which has been unrightfully gained at the expense of African
Americans.?21 Under this analysis, the issue of unfair assignment of group
responsibility is replaced by the notion of entitlement only to justly acquired
holdings, and disgorgement of unjustly acquired holdings.
C. American Precedent: The Civil Liberties Act
1. Japanese American Reparations
Apart from the Freedmen's Bureau Acts,222 the key federal precedent
for reparations 223 as compensation for racially motivated government acts is
219 ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 151 (1974).
220 Id.
221 Fiscus, supra note 67, at 8-9, 37-50 (arguing that framing affrmative action in a dis-
tributive justice context helps negate the perception of unfairness to white males because indi-
viduals only receive what they would get in a fair world rather than individuals being com-
pensated for past wrongs committed by past generations). In the context of African American
reparations, the claim is for both.
222 See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the
Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the legislative troubles in overcoming President Johnson's ve-
toes).
23 Reparations have also been pursued on a state level. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 240.4126 (West 1998) (creating a scholarship program for minority students enrolled at
public universities, community colleges, and vocational-technical schools, with "preference
given to the direct descendants of the Rosewood families"); 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commis-
sion Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8201 (West Supp. 1998) (calling for the collection of
interviews and evidence of the events in the Greenwood area of Tulsa on or about May 31 or
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the Civil Liberties Act (the "Act"), which provided restitution for the World
War II internment of Japanese Americans and Aleuts.
224
During World War II, all individuals of Japanese ancestry living in the
United States were excluded from military zones and subject to forced
evacuation and relocation to detention centers, without regard for their citi-
zenship, pursuant to Executive Order 9066.25 The Supreme Court upheld
enforcement of the order.226
Four decades later, Congress established the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians to study and document the impact of
Executive Order 9066 on Japanese American citizens and permanent resi-
dent aliens. The Commission found that:
The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous damages,
both material and intangible, and there were incalculable losses in education
and job training, all of which resulted in significant human suffering for which
appropriate compensation has not been made.... [T]hese [werel2i ndamental
violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional ights ....
Along with an acknowledgment and apology for the "grave injus-
tice.., done," 228 the Act provided for: (1) compensation in the amount of
$20,000 to individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned, and living
on the date of the enactment of the Act (or to their living heirs); and (2) a
June 1, 1921, in order to determine the need for reparations for racially motivated wrongful
conduct); Rosewood Massacre Investigation & Compensation Act, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 94-359 (West) (ordering compensation for any African American families of Rosewood
demonstrating real or personal property loss damages up to $100,000 for property, and al-
lowing any African American who was present and affected by the 1923 riot and subsequent
evacuation to be compensated for up to $150,000 regardless of property loss); H.R. Con. Res.
22, 1st Ex. Sess., 1996 La. Sess. Law Serv. A-2 (West) (acknowledging and apologizing for
Louisiana's role in the institution of slavery); cf S. 318, 177th Leg. (Mass. 1992) (calling for
reparations for slavery, the slave trade, and invidious discrimination); African-American
Reparation Study Commission Act, H.R. 934, 179th Leg. (Pa. 1995) (calling for the acknowl-
edgment of slavery in Pennsylvania, and establishing a commission to study the de jure and de
facto discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants, and to recommend the appro-
priate remedy, including reparations).
224 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989-1989d (1994). The current proposed legislation for Afri-
can American reparations is closely modeled after the precursor to the Civil Liberties Act that
called for a study of the internment impact. See H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997) (calling for the
establishment of "a commission to examine the institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and
de facto racial and economic discrimination against African Americans... and to make rec-
ommendations to the Congress on appropriate remedies").
225 See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942) (authorizing the establishment of
military areas and the exclusion therefrom of any or all persons, citizens, or aliens).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (sustaining a conviction for
violation of the exclusion order, under the auspices of "[p]ressing public necessity").
227 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a).
228 Id.
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public education fund to facilitate public awareness of the internment and
prevent a recurrence.229 The entitlement to compensation now extends to all
children of excluded individuals eligible under the Act who were deprived
of liberty by exclusion from their families' domiciles.
230
2. Reparations to the Aleuts
According to the statement of Congress:
[T]he Aleut civilian residents of the Pribilof Islands and the Aleutian Islands
west of Unimak Island were relocated to temporary camps in isolated regions
of southeast Alaska where they remained, under United States control and in
the care of the United States, until long after any potential danger to their home
villages had passed.
231
The grant to Aleuts is often overlooked when the Act is discussed in
relation to reparations for African Americans.232 The Commission's find-
ings with respect to the Aleuts, however, are instructive in establishing gov-
ernmental liability for misfeasance:
The United States failed to provide reasonable care for the Aleuts, and this re-
sulted in widespread illness, disease, and death among the residents of the
camps; and the United States further failed to protect Aleut personal and com-
munm property while such property was in its possession or under its con-
trol.
The Act granted compensation to Aleut residents for property taken or
destroyed by the United States during World War II and "for injustices and
unreasonable hardships endured" while the Aleuts were under United States
control during the war.
23 4
3. An Analogy to African Americans
The monetary reparations paid to Japanese Americans were funded by
the tax dollars of United States citizens. Obviously, the broad group that
shouldered responsibility for payment of the compensation included at least
"four groups of 'innocents"': "1) people who were not born in 1941;
229 Id. § 1989.
230 See Ishida v. United States, 59 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Watanabe v.
United States, 66 F.3d 345 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (granting compensation under Ishida); Sato v.
United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 818 (1995) (same).
231 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(b).
232 See Magee, supra note 169, at 904-06 (discussing reparations to Japanese Americans
but excluding discussion of the Aleuts); Verdun, supra note 7, at 646-59 (same).
233 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(b).
234 Id. § 1989(5).
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2) people who were alive but objected strenuously to the internment; 3)
people who immigrated to the United States after the internment was over;
and 4) a host of other people who just had nothing whatsoever to do with
it."'2 35 One way in which the African American case is more complex than
that of the Japanese Americans and Aleuts is that African Americans have
suffered from not one, but many harmful acts by both private citizens and
state and federal governments. Ironically, the existence of private actors
should make the argument for legislative reparations stronger in the case of
African Americans, because it clouds the innocence of the so-called "inno-
cents." If tax dollars were used to fund reparations to African Americans,
the group responsible for payment would include the parallel "innocent"
groups to the Japanese American reparations scenario: "1) people who were
born after slavery ended ... ; 2) abolitionists; 3) people who immigrated af-
ter slavery ended; and 4) people who are not descendants of slavehold-
,,236ers. The difference between the African American and the Japanese
American scenario is that most, if not all, of the "innocents" in the African
American case have benefited from many of the wrongs giving rise to the
237reparations.
In sum, the Civil Liberties Act recognized tangible and intangible
harms caused by federal action and inaction. The Act established a prece-
dent for legislative compensation to a particular racial group that suffered
unique injuries due to racially motivated law enforcement. Based on a
comparison of the "victim" experiences, it is difficult to fathom a reasonable
justification for not enacting the African American Reparations bill. Simple
substitutions in the language of the congressional findings for the Japanese
Americans and the Aleuts could easily provide a starting point to summarize
the case for African Americans:
The [enslaved] individuals of [African] ancestry [and their descendants] suf-
fered enormous damages, both material and intangible, and there were incal-
culable losses in education and job training, all of which resulted in significant
human suffering for which appropriate compensation has not been made....
[Tlhese [were] fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties and constitu-
tional rights ... 238
The United States failed to provide reasonable care for the [Africans and their
descendants], and this resulted in widespread illness, disease, and death among
235 Verdun, supra note 7, at 653.
236 Id. at 654.
237 "[W]hite Americans are not guilty of practicing slavery and most are not actively en-
gaged in economic discrimination, but most are collectively the beneficiaries of slavery and
economic discrimination." Id. at 636 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
238 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a); see supra text accompanying note 227.
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the [African American population]; 23 9 and the United States further failed to
protect [African Americans and their] personal and community property [by
uniform enforcement of the law].
240
B. Reconciling African American Reparations and
the Equal Protection Clause
2 41
In the wake of Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Peha,242 race-based con-
gressional legislation must now withstand the same strict scrutiny standard
that has been applied to the states since City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 243 and that standard applies whether or not the measure benefits or
burdens the affected race.
In his extensive analysis of Reconstruction Era legislation, Eric
Schnapper argues that the legislative intent behind the Fourteenth Amend-
ment confirms the constitutionality of certain race-based remedies.2
Schnapper bases his argument on the contemporaneous consideration of the
239 For example, post-slavery incidents like the Tuskeegee syphillis experiments "ha[ve]
contributed greatly to distrust among African Americans of the medical establishment." See
Donna Franklin, Beyond the Tuskegee Apology, WASH. POST, May 29, 1997, at A23 (dis-
cussing the mistrust that African Americans have for the health care facilities as a result of
racially motivated medical abuse).
In 1939, seven years after the Tuskegee experiment began, the Birth Control Federa-
tion of America (the successor to the American Birth Control League) planned a
"Negro Project" directed at the "mass of Negroes, particularly in the South," be-
cause it considered that segment of the population "least fit, and least able to rear
children properly."
Id. The Department of Health Education and Welfare "estimated that in 1972 between
100,000 and 200,000 sterilizations had been funded by the federal govemment" Id. "Tjhis
distrust [resulting from historic medical abuse] in turn has life-or-death consequences for [Af-
rican Americans] who are disproportionately affected by IV, AIDS and other illnesses---and
who may not seek treatment for fear of being misused." Id.
240 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(b); see supra text accompanying note 233.
241 By inverse incorporation, the 14th Amendment extends to federal action via the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that although the Fifth
Amendment does not have an equal protection clause, sometimes "discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process").
242 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that federal programs using racial classifications
must meet the strict scrutiny standard announced in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989)).
243 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (holding that the strict scrutiny standard applies equally to
measures both benefiting and burdening minorities).
244 See Schnapper, supra note 31, at 754 (arguing that "the legislative history of the
fourteenth amendment is not only relevant to but dispositive of the legal dispute regarding
constitutional standards applicable to race-conscious affirmative action plans").
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Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedmen's Bureau Acts.2 45  He argues
that:
The framers of the fourteenth amendment cannot have intended it to nullify
remedial legislation of the sort Congress simultaneously adopted.... [The
legislative debates] provide clear examples of the kinds of reasons and circum-
stances that would justify the use of race-conscious remedies in the eyes of
[the framers]. Conversely, the arguments made unsuccessfully against those
programs by the legislators who also opposed the fourteenth amendment can-
not represent the standards embodied in the amendment.
246
Schnapper's analysis has not been 100% persuasive before federal
courts in refuting the argument that race-preferential remedies violate the
Fourteenth Amendment per se by discriminating against those -not targeted
by the remedy.247 His argument, however, is particularly relevant to the
reparations issue, when the objectives and ideologies behind the Recon-
struction Acts and Amendments are understood.
Congress specifically enacted the Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to ensure the citizenship rights of African Ameri-
cans. Thus, "[t]here is no violation of equal protection when society acts to
restore the equilibrium that would have naturally occurred under nonracist
conditions. Indeed, to fail to maintain the equilibrium by using final-stage
measures of merit is to allow the processes of racism to culminate in their
inevitable inequities.,,248 Foner notes that the major Reconstruction legisla-
tion resulted from a "complex series of legislative compromises and maneu-
vers" sponsored by senators and congressmen with significant influence.
249
According to Schnapper's discussion of the legislative history, two domi-
nant motivations drove supporters of the Freedmen's Acts. The first was
that the Acts would aid the freedmen's transition from slavery to freedom,
and thus alleviate the social burden associated with the four million Afri-
245 See id. at 768, 784 (noting the concurrent debates, the common sponsors of the Bu-
reau Acts and the 14th Amendment, and the view that the Bureau Act secured protection for
the freed slaves).
246 Id. at 789.
247 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 1997) (chal-
lenging, but failing to stop, the enactment of Article 1, § 31 of the California Constitution
(Proposition 209) on the grounds that it denied equal protection and conflicted with federal
civil rights statutes); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 ("The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting."); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932, 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
use of race as a factor in law school admissions in favor of increasing minority enrollment
violates the 14th Amendment).
248 FISCUS, supra note 67, at 38-39.
249 FONER, supra note 7, at 130.
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cans who were uneducated and without land or assets. The second was to
give the freed slaves the opportunity to establish their economic independ-
ence.
251
Thaddeus Stevens, Speaker of the House, argued for redistribution of
the land to enable the emergence of a "new class of black and white yeo-
men," who would replace the planter class of the south, serve as the basis
for future southern political and social power, and ally themselves with the
northern Republican middle class. 252 Stevens was a proponent of enabling
the economic independence of freedmen, so as to prepare them for full citi-
253zenry which would eventually include voting rights. The sponsors of the
Fourteenth Amendment were Congressman Stevens, Senator Wade, and
Congressman Bingham, who authored the Amendment. The sponsors of the
Bureau Act were Senator Trumbull and Congressman Eliot. 4 The propo-
nents of the Bureau Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment subscribed to the
promotion of self-sufficiency, so as to preclude an indefinite dependence on
public assistance. They supported special assistance for freedmen in
view of the freedmen's lack of "political influence of whites to advance
their own interests" 256 and for the "'safety of the nation.'
257
Given that the motivation behind reparations to African Americans is to
provide the means to enfranchise a group that has been intentionally denied
the social status, resources, and well-being required to enjoy the civil and
political rights to which every United States citizen is entitled, legislative
reparations follow the precedents for allowing race-based remedies.
250 See Schnapper, supra note 31, at 755-56 (discussing the responsibilities of the newly
created Bureau of Freedmen's Affairs that were designed to further this goal).
251 See id. at 758 ("After a life of servitude ... these freedmen ... have this ight... to
earn among us their own subsistence."' (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 572
(1863) (statement of Rep. Thomas Eliot))).
252 FONER, supra note 7, at 134.
253 See id. at 133 (discussing Stevens's view that unless Congress delayed giving suffrage
to freedmen until they were free from the "economic coercion" of the southern states, the
south would not be transformed).
254 See Schnapper, supra note 31, at 784 (noting that all voted in favor of both the
Amendment and the Acts).
255 See id. at 758 (discussing Congressman Eliot's proposition that taxing whites to aid
African Americans at that time would help African Americans to become self-sufficient).
256 Id. at 768 (summarizing Congressman Phelps's argument).
257 Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 590 (1866) (statement of Rep. Don-
nelly)).
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V. ANTICIPATING THE OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
The African-American Reparations Commissions Act is closely pat-
terned after the precursor to the Civil Liberties Act.258 The purposes of H.R.
40 are: (1) to acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and
inhumanity of slavery in the United States and the thirteen American colo-
nies between 1619 and 1865; and (2) to establish a commission to examine
the institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and eco-
nomic discrimination against African Americans, and the impact of these
forces on living African Americans, and to make recommendations to the
Congress for appropriate remedies. 9
Representative Conyers, author of H.R. 40, has not yet specified what
form of reparations should be pursued in the event of a positive finding by
the commission. 26  The question of implementation for an African Ameri-
can reparations scheme, however, is not only what should the compensation
be, but who are the appropriate beneficiaries. As previously stated, it is be-
yond the scope of this Comment to exhaustively state the types and extent
of harms suffered by African Americans as a result of slavery and ensuing
private and government discriminatory action. Accordingly, it is not this
author's intention to assume the formidable task of definitively stating what
reparations for African Americans should be. Rather, this is an attempt to
address some of the problems that have been or may be posed as obstacles
to the implementation of reparations for African Americans.
A. Who?
Unlike the injured group in the case for Japanese American repara-
tions,261 the African Americans injured from slavery and the ensuing sys-
temic discrimination number in the millions.262  Considering the pool of
258 See Commission on Wartime Relocation and Interment of Civilians Act, Pub. L. No.
96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981 (1988)).
259 See African American Reparations Commission Act, H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997).
260 An official specification at this point could cloud Representative Conyers's objectiv-
ity in calling for a commission regarding H.R. 40. See Betsy Peoples, A Simple Gesture,
EMERGE, Sept. 1997, at 42, 42-46 (reporting on an interview with Representative John
Conyers and others, including an attorney for the National Coalition of Blacks for Repara-
tions).
261 See Verdun, supra note 7, at 655 (noting that the injured group of Japanese Ameri-
cans-those actually interned-is "relatively small, and members of the class are identifiable
from existing records").
262 The black American population as of 1996 was reported as 33,503,000. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 18 tbl.18 (1997).
Note that this number may include people of various ethnicities, such as Hispanics, that one
would not normally identify as African American. See id. at 19 tbl.19 n.1.
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black Americans, it is safe to concede that not all black people in America
are descendants of African slaves.2 63 Moreover, individuals who are de-
scendants of slaves may not necessarily have descended from African
American slaves. Despite these uncertainties, there are several possible ap-
proaches to answering the "who" question to identify the appropriate bene-
ficiaries of African American reparations.
One approach is to adjust the degree of eligibility according to the
number of generations an individual's family has resided in America. Such
an approach could reasonably limit entitlements and avoid overburdening
those who are not African American.264 Eligibility based on generational
considerations would also be consistent with the argument that black/white
inequities are partially due to the intergenerational transfer of wealth among
white Americans.
The distinction of origin and generational citizenship, however, loses
some of its significance in some relation to the length of time an African
American family has been in America. An immigrant of African descent
will suffer the same discrimination and advantages as indigenous African
Americans regardless of his actual citizenship. In time, the cumulative
harm to that immigrant's generation residing in America will approach the
harm caused to indigenous African Americans. Furthermore, by reason of
the slave experience in the Caribbean, England, South America, and other
regions whence blacks have migrated to this country, the entitlement to re-
mediation might be considered absolute. Thus, an alternative approach is to
require only that beneficiaries have American citizenship.
Ultimately, the appropriate beneficiary of a remedial measure will de-
pend upon the particular remediation. The difficulty in identifying benefici-
aries-and which beneficiaries have suffered which particular injuries--can
be alleviated by applying the fluid recovery mechanism sometimes used in
class action suits. 265 "In a fluid recovery the money is either distributed
through a market system in the way of reduced charges or is used to fund a
263 See id. at 11 tbl.8 (showing the data for immigrants from areas including the Carib-
bean, South America, and Africa).
264 Note that even children of Japanese American origin who were born after their fami-
lies were excluded from the original family home are now entitled to compensation under
Ishida. See supra text accompanying note 230 (discussing recent case law that grants com-
pensation to children for exclusion from their family's domicile); see also Ishida v. United
States, 59 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
265 Fluid recovery is used in class actions suits where the number of injured individuals is
excessive, and the individuals are unlikely to prove their claims individually or cannot be
given notice. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that fluid
recovery is appropriate where injured individuals are not likely to come forward because of
their large numbers).
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project which will likely benefit the members of the class."266 The use of
this mechanism would be appropriate, because legislative reparations-as
this Comment justifies them-would embody policies of disgorgement,
compensation, and deterrence.267 The population of African American citi-
zens should be treated as the class of injured parties, and divided into sub-
classes as necessary to determine eligibility for specific remedies.
B. What and How?
If the overall goal of reparations for African Americans is to eventually
enable a harmonious and diverse democracy, then the remedies and com-
pensation must necessarily target areas critical to social well-being and eco-
nomic empowerment. That, in turn, should ensure the opportunity to enjoy
civil rights and enable political empowerment.
1. Non-Specific Reparations
A logical starting point for African American reparations is to extend an
acknowledgment and apology for the grave injustices done, and at least pro-
vide: (1) some amount of monetary compensation for individuals (or their
living heirs) who were either slaves or alive during the Jim Crow era, and
living on the date of the enactment of the Reparations Act; and (2) a public
education fund to facilitate public awareness of slavery, the Jim Crow era,
and systemic discrimination, and to prevent their recurrence.268 Although
no amount of money can compensate for the injuries suffered, governments
have issued some form of monetary compensation to many groups whose
269fundamental human rights have been violated. Yet, even assuming an ar-
bitrary sum set at an amount of only $20,000 per individual, some would
argue that the total monetary award to African American beneficiaries
would approach unfeasible and excessive sums.
266 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 47 (2d
ed. Supp. 1997) (criticizing the market system of fluid recovery for consumer plaintiffs in the
form of coupons because that practice fails to give real relief to the plaintiff class).
267 See Simer, 661 F.2d at 676 ("The general inquiry is whether the use of [fluid recov-
ery] is consistent with the policy or policies reflected by the statute violated. This matter can
be more particularized into an assessment of to what extent the statute embodies policies of
deterrence, disgorgement, and compensation.").
268 This mirrors the Civil Liberties Act. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1994); supra text
accompanying notes 238-40 (describing how minimal revision of the Civil Liberties Act could
encompass the harms that African Americans have suffered).
269 See supra notes 182-83 (noting the monetary reparations from Germany to Jewish
Holocaust victims and from Japan to Korean comfort women).
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An alternative to issuing actual monetary awards is to allow a compara-
ble tax exemption over a period of years. This approach essentially results
in the African American beneficiaries paying themselves, because the result
is theoretically the same as if the beneficiaries' tax dollars were pooled and
then redistributed. Arguably, such an exemption for African Americans in-
creases the tax burden on nonreparee taxpayers, particularly if the tax bur-
den of nonreparees is increased specifically to cover what would otherwise
be contributed absent the exemption. Even with an increased tax obligation,
nonreparee taxpayers might consider the exemption a substantial subsidiza-
tion because reparees would still be entitled to all the benefits enjoyed by
the average citizen. Nevertheless, this potential subsidization should not be
a barrier to monetary compensation because such compensation has been
afforded to Japanese Americans and Aleuts.
270
A "public education fund to increase awareness" is a non-specific rem-
edy that would provide redress for the gross historical understatement of the
African American contribution to the development of the United States. In-
stead of reserving one month out of the year to acknowledge the various
histories of non-white, non-male American groups,271 the education cur-
riculum must move away from its current monocultural, Eurocentric focus,
toward a more inclusive reflection of American culture and history. African
Americans as a group, as well as American society as a whole, would
eventually benefit as fallacies of inferiority and social irresponsibility are
replaced by a true understanding of how integral the African American
presence has been to the success of our capitalist foundation.
2. Specific Reparations
It is simply unrealistic to think that relief from the effects of deep-
rooted inequities and discrimination can be resolved by a lump sum pay-
ment. Therefore, reparations must include specific remedies that address
the specific harms suffered. Areas for reparation measures include housing
and land ownership, education, employment, and loans.
To the extent that non-specific and specific remedies can be accommo-
dated by affirmative action, reparations and affirmative action must not be
mutually exclusive. We should, however, revisit the construct of affirma-
tive action and resolve the misconceptions that hinder the effectiveness of
270 See supra text accompanying notes 235-37 (discussing how the existence of private
actors in wrongdoings against African Americans strengthens the argument for tax dollar sub-
sidization as reparations in this case).
271 For example, February is "Black History Month" and March is "Women's History
Month.'
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these programs. One drawback that makes affirmative action susceptible to
attack is that there are no clear goals that indicate progress and mark the
point at which affirmative action is no longer necessary. In the context of
reparations, the goals are to ensure full citizenship and to correct past
wrongs, where the measure of success is a tangible metric.
a. Housing Discrimination Remedies
A brief analysis of the two remedies currently used for systemic hous-
ing discrimination in federally subsidized housing programs--"mobility re-
lief' and "equalization relief' 272--provides a useful illustration of how spe-
cific remedies should be used. "Mobility relief attempts to alleviate the
isolation caused by segregation by moving victims of discrimination closer
to better schools and a better supply of jobs in safer areas." 273 This is ac-
complished via one of two methods. Either the victim is transferred to a
unit or project within a development in which the victim's race does not
predominate, or the victim receives Section Eight certificates to enable
"federally assisted housing in nonracially impacted areas."274 In contrast,
equalization relief includes such remedies as "housing rehabilitation and
modernization, the submission of [detailed] equalization plans .. , housing
code enforcement, provision of certain amenities and tenant services,
demolition of dilapidated housing with one-for-one unit replacement, and
real community redevelopment addressing neighborhood conditions, mu-
nicipal services, and exposure to environmental hazards. 2 75 Equalization
relief has generally been more difficult to obtain than mobility relief.
276
From the perspective of a reparations advocate, equalization is a better rem-
edy because it remedies the discrimination in a way that empowers the vic-
tim.
Most often, victims of housing discrimination live in racially segregated
areas. These areas become undesirable not because of the purely social as-
272 See generally Adams, supra note 131 (discussing the two mobility programs and
equalization relief). In addition to its use to remedy discrimination in public-housing site se-
lection and tenant selection, assignment, and transfer, mobility relief has been awarded to
plaintiffs challenging school segregation. See id. at 448-49.
273 Id. at447.
274 Id. Use of Section Eight certificates in "(non)racially impacted areas" is one remedy
to discrimination in public-housing site selection because it enables certificate holders to live
outside of race-concentrated urban areas. See id. at 447 & n.159.
275 Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted).
276 See id. at 466 (describing the difficulties encountered in seeking equalization relief
because of the intense research required to prove that "the discriminatory actors maintained
superior government-subsidized housing for whites" and the narrowed scope of antidiscrimi-
nation laws).
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pect of segregation, 277 but because of the consequential impact of discrimi-
nation on services, job availability, and safety in the areas.278 Equalization
accommodates the right to choose by allowing the affected individuals to
remain in an area that would be desirable, but for the effects of discrimina-
tion. When municipal services, school facilities, crime deterrence, and pro-
tection from environmental hazard exposure are brought on a par with non-
segregated areas, the civil and social aspects of full citizenship are restored.
Equalization relief also enables political empowerment by allowing African
Americans to remain in a concentrated area. This is significant for strength-
ening the political voice-dilution of political strength occurs when mobil-
ity is the sole relief option.
279
b. Education Remedies
Another drawback of affirmative action is that the term is simultane-
ously used to describe programs that are (1) vehicles to correct past dis-
crimination; (2) vehicles to diversify (based on gender, race and class); as
well as (3) vehicles to give candidates who lack the traditional qualifications
the opportunity to prove themselves.280 The implications of the latter two
stigmatize the first because whites (particularly, males) feel excluded or
"discriminated against" when all three initiatives are thought to be one and
the same.28 In the context of reparations, uncertainties and ambiguities can
277 For instance, one study reports that, given the choice, African American mobility re-
lief recipients preferred to relocate to areas with significant African American populations.
See id. at 452.
278 See id. at 464-66 (noting the pervasive influence of discrimination on community in-
frastructure).
279 Vote dilution occurs when the African American population in a district is decreased,
such that the collective group vote-assuming the group tends to vote the same way-is out-
weighed by the majority white vote. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 153, at 210 (discussing
this and other diminutive vote practices); see also supra note 78 (discussing proposed alterna-
tive voting schemes that might enhance minority representation). Attempts to draw voting
district lines that maximize the number of majority African American districts are subject to
strict scrutiny. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644, 647 (holding that allegations that North
Carolina's redistricting legislation amounted to racial gerrymandering--concentrating a dis-
persed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting princi-
ples-supported a claim for relief under the 14th Amendment).
280
The concept [of affirmative action] subsumes a set of programs ranging from, at its
mildest, wide advertising of positions to prompt more people to apply or extensive
recruitment of potential applicants, through the use of ranges and goals in hiring, to,
ultimately, at its most severe, the use of fixed quotas for hiring and promotion.
Fiscus, supra note 67, at ix-x.
281 See id. at x ( "[Many opponents of affirmative action label all disliked programs
'quotas' because of the negative resonance of that term .... ).
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be eliminated because the initiative is to compensate for harm suffered. The
measure of progress is equalization.
As applied to education, this may call for short-term remediation, in
which affirmative action is taken to level the playing field for the next three
school-aged generations. A hypothetical scenario might be as follows:
Phase one: For the next three generations (or at least for the next thirty-six
years), any pre-college educational institution that is heavily populated by
African American students from historically disadvantaged areas, for the
express purpose of providing remedial education, could be government-
funded and/or receive government contracts. Such schools would be geared
toward college preparatory programs at the high school level. Phase two:
Then, for the following two generations (or at least over the following
twenty-four years), implement proactive recruiting and financial assistance
for minority applicants that meet the "standard" entrance criteria to public
and private colleges. Simultaneously, create college access programs for
disadvantaged students who show academic potential but do not meet the
current standard entrance criteria due to prior discrimination in education.
The objective of such a scenario would be to level the playing field in
preparation for the removal of race and ethnicity indications from all college
application materials starting twelve years after the end of Phase two; and
removal of the same from all pre-college applications starting at end of
Phase one, thus achieving a race-neutral meritocracy in education.
c. Other Remedies
Discrimination in areas such as loans and employment are more diffi-
cult to address, because these involve more subjective evaluations on the
part of private individuals. To the extent that fair loan qualification can be
monitored, reparations could grant lower loan rates for a specific period of
time to African Americans who have suffered discrimination as compensa-
tion for the loss in equity and economic opportunity. Where such subjective
evaluations are involved, however, non-specific reparations-such as the
above-mentioned "public education fund to increase awareness"-- can only
attempt to sway individual attitudes.
CONCLUSION
In sum, I have argued that providing reparations for African Americans
is not only a justifiable remedy, but a prerequisite to racial harmony and any
movement toward race neutrality. I have shown-though by no means is
the illustration exhaustive-that current inequalities between African
Americans and white Americans are rooted in historic patterns of discrimi-
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nation by federal, state, and private actors. Reparations for African Ameri-
cans must come in the form of legislation, because the courts provide no
available recourse, given the procedural barriers of sovereign immunity,
statutes of limitations, causation, and standing. In addition to general relief
that would benefit this multicultural nation as a whole, specific remedies
and compensation can be targeted to rectify specific inequities. Thus, leg-
islative reparations to African Americans would not be unlike previous race-
based remedies that were deemed constitutional.
There is an old saying that applies here: Sweep around your own front
door before you sweep around mine. It is time for America to ensure the
citizenry rights of African Americans with the same commitment and zeal
that America has demonstrated in protecting human rights abroad.
* * * * * *
